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Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.:
A Roadmap for Gender Equality in




In June 2001, a federal district court held in Erickson v.
Bartell Drug Co. 1 that an employer's decision to exclude
prescription contraceptives from its prescription benefits plan was
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,2
as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). 3
Erickson is an example that Title VII can be a powerful tool for
ensuring gender equality in health care. Less well known is that
plaintiffs have also tried using Title VII and the PDA to challenge
exclusions of infertility treatments, but with very little success. 4
This was true even where the employer excluded only surgical
treatments that were used by women.
These cases are significant for two reasons. First, they
illustrate the danger of discrimination in the allocation of
employment-based health care benefits. Such discrimination
represents the nexus of a long history of pregnancy-based
employment discrimination and a devaluation of women's
reproductive health care-a nexus that compounds several harms
to women. Women are disadvantaged financially because they are
*Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. J.D., University of Southern
California Law School; B.A., University of Chicago. I would like to give special
thanks to Melissa Cole, Judith Darr, Richard Hasen, Lisa Ikemoto, Sam Pillsbury,
Katherine Pratt, Rhonda Reaves, Ted Seto, and Gary Williams for their thoughtful
comments and helpful discussion. I also greatly benefited from the opportunity to
present my ideas at St. Louis University's Health Law Scholars Workshop and the
American Society of Law, Medicine, & Ethics Annual Health Law Teachers'
Meeting. Finally, I am indebted to Jennell Mimms for her invaluable research
assistance.
1. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1276-77 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
4. See infra notes 233-294 and accompanying text.
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denied the complete insurance benefits afforded men. Lack of
insurance coverage typically means a denial of medically
necessary care creating physical, emotional, and further economic
harm. Moreover, differential treatment of women's reproductive
health care reflects and perpetuates stereotypes about proper
gender roles and women's sexual freedom.
These cases also present competing theories of the role of civil
rights law in challenging benefits exclusions. Erickson reveals the
promise of Title VII as a powerful tool for challenging such
exclusions. In contrast, the approach evident from other
reproductive health benefits cases (what I term the "dominant
approach") appears to be a watered-down version of Title VII that
targets only the most obvious forms of discrimination and allows
benefits exclusions to go essentially unchecked. This raises a
critical question which I explore in this Article: Is Title VII, as
amended by the PDA, really the powerful tool for ensuring gender
equality in reproductive health care that Erickson suggests?
Part I lays out the basic legal framework for Title VII cases,
including the elements required to make out the prima facie case
for disparate treatment or impact claims, and the defenses
available to employers. 5 Despite the fact that Title VII expressly
prohibits sex discrimination in the administration of fringe
benefits, such as health insurance, courts have traditionally
resisted seeing benefits exclusions as a civil rights issue.6 This
resistance was exemplified in 1976 in the Supreme Court's
decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.7 In Gilbert, the Court
held that an employer's short-term disability policy that excluded
pregnancy-related disabilities did not violate Title VII's
prohibition on sex discrimination.8 The Court refused to see the
pregnancy exclusion as a sex-based classification that implicated
Title VII and simply deferred to the employer's justifications for
the exclusion. 9 Women's advocates and Congress reacted swiftly,
and in 1978, the PDA amended Title VII to expressly provide that
classifications based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions are sex-based classifications in violation of Title VII.1o
In doing so, the PDA affirmed two important principles. First, it
made clear that antidiscrimination law is an appropriate tool for
5. See infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
7. 429 U.S. 125 (1976); see infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
8. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 128, 145-46.
9. Id. at 127-46; see infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000); infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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challenging benefits exclusions.11 Second, it reinforced the notion
that pregnancy-related exclusions should be scrutinized closely
because of the unique effects suffered by women and the likelihood
that such exclusions are motivated by gender bias. 12
In Parts II and III, I use these principles to determine
whether Title VII, as amended by the PDA, is a viable tool for
ensuring gender equality in reproductive health care, by focusing
specifically on exclusions of prescription contraceptives and
infertility treatment. 13 In Part II, I demonstrate why express
insurance exclusions for prescription contraception and infertility
satisfy the prima facie case for Title VII. 14 For each, I give
extensive background about the purposes and forms of treatment
and identify common patterns of insurance exclusions found in
employment-based health plans. 15 Most prescription contraception
exclusions will constitute disparate treatment because the forms
excluded tend to be those used only by women.16 Both prescription
contraception and infertility exclusions appear to satisfy the prima
facie case for disparate impact because of the greater cost burden
and unique health risks suffered by women as a result of the
exclusions. 17
In Part III, I offer further evidence why courts should closely
scrutinize these exclusions, with employers bearing the burden to
justify them.1 8 Evidence suggests that such exclusions may be
motivated by bias about women's proper reproductive role in
society and by a fear of devices or drugs that enable women's
sexual freedom or their ability to prioritize their career over
childbearing. 19 Furthermore, infertility exclusions also appear to
be an extension of the longstanding bias of employers' devaluing
pregnant or potentially pregnant employees. 20 Requiring the
employer to state its justifications for reproductive health
exclusions allows plaintiffs the opportunity to prove that
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
12. See id.
13. See infra notes 84-232 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 84-160 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 85-127 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 128-136 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 128-136 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 161-232 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 164-196 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief
for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (2003); see also infra notes 192-206 and accompanying text.
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employers' justifications are mere pretext for bias. 21 The
likelihood that bias is really motivating these exclusions is
suggested when we examine the most common employer
justifications given and see that they are not legitimate on either
medical or policy grounds. 22 Comparing employers' treatment of
female-specific reproductive health benefits to their policies for
male-specific benefits and non-reproductive health conditions
provides further support that such exclusions are really part of a
larger pattern of discrimination in women's reproductive health
care. 23 Finally, cost is always at the heart of employment benefits
decisions, but it cannot be a defense to a disparate treatment claim.
In addition, it is highly questionable whether cost can provide a
legal or even credible defense or rebuttal for a disparate impact
challenge to reproductive health exclusions. Admittedly, this is
where the analyses for prescription contraception and infertility
appear to diverge because of the different socio-economic and
medical effects of treatment and implications for distributive
justice concerns that underlie all health policy decisions.
Despite the fact that these exclusions result in harmful
effects on women and are likely being used to advance parochial
values of women's proper reproductive roles and limits on their
sexual freedom, 24 I show that courts overwhelmingly resist the
notion that exclusions are gender discrimination under Title VII.25
In Part IV, I show that courts, under the "dominant approach,"
resist these claims by interpreting the PDA narrowly to only
protect exclusions of sex-specific conditions, regardless of the
relationship between the excluded treatment and pregnancy;
focusing on the gender-neutral aspects of the exclusion as the
predominate reason for denying the plaintiff's prima facie case;
and failing to apply a meaningful disparate impact analysis that
would take into account the disproportionate health and cost
effects to women.26
In Part V I consider why courts take this approach in light of
the evidence presented of disparate effects and gender bias in
Parts II and III of this Article.27 Considering these benefits cases
21. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973) (providing
employees the opportunity to show that the explanation given by their employer for
denying opportunities was merely pretextual or discriminatory).
22. See infra notes 207-232 and accompanying text.
23. Id.
24. See infra notes 161-232 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 233-294 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 235-294 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 293-347 and accompanying text.
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within the larger context of Title VII litigation generally reveals
two tensions that underlie this resistance: (1) judicial tendency to
analyze reproductive health issues under a privacy rights
paradigm as opposed to an equality paradigm;28 and (2) misplaced
fear by courts that plaintiffs are using the PDA to obtain special
protection or entitlements for pregnancy, which would undermine
the equality principles underlying Title VII. 29 I address these
concerns by making clear that the dominant approach actually
undermines the equality principles underlying Title VII.30 In Part
VI, I use the court's analysis in Erickson to demonstrate how a
more protective model of Title VII should be used in challenges to
reproductive health exclusions in order to achieve the promise of
equality guaranteed in Title VII and the PDA.31
I. Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
A. Basic Title VII Prohibition and Proof Structure
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in all
aspects of employment, including discrimination with respect to
the "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment."3 2 To make out a prima facie case, the plaintiff must
allege that an employer intentionally treats men and women
differently (disparate treatment) 33 or that the employer has a
policy or practice that falls more harshly on men or women
(disparate impact).34
Where the employer has a policy that is facially
discriminatory, the prima facie case for disparate treatment is
easily made out. 35 However, in cases where a policy does not
28. See infra notes 293-347 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 307-313 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 314-342 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 348-363 and accompanying text.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). The relevant provision states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer [t]o fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id.
33. See L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978).
34. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) ("Under [Title VII]
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of
intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices.").
35. See, e.g., Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-98 (1991)
2005]
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facially treat men and women differently, a plaintiff may either
present evidence showing that the employer intentionally adopted
a policy for a discriminatory reason3 6 or show that the policy's
effects fall more harshly on one group than the other.3 7
Once the plaintiff makes out the prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to rebut it in one of two ways. In either case,
the employer may produce evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the policy.38 In disparate impact
cases, the employer can also rebut the factual claim that the
specific employment practice causes a significant adverse
(ruling that policy that excluded fertile women but not fertile men from a particular
job involving lead exposure classifies by gender and childbearing capacity); Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977) (ruling that state regulation of height
and weight requirements for maximum security prison guards that unfairly
discriminated against women); Wilson v. SW Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 303-05
(N.D. Tex. 1981) (ruling on refusal to hire men for public contact positions of flight
attendants and ticket agent to personify airlines' sexy image and promise to take
passengers with love). Examples of this have occurred in the benefits context as
well. See, e.g., a Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred
Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1079-86 (1983) (explaining that the
employer-sponsored pension fund in which women received lower monthly
retirement benefits than male employees who contributed the same amount to the
fund was a sex-based classification in violation of Title VII); Manhart, 435 U.S. at
712-15 (holding that policy requiring women to make larger contributions to an
employer-operated pension fund than male employees discriminates on the basis of
sex); see also EEOC Dec. No. 77-8 (Feb. 28, 1977) CCH EEOC Dec. 6563 (holding
that providing group life insurance that provided for sex-based differences in death
benefits, with women receiving greater benefits than men at each corresponding
age level, violated Title VII); EEOC Dec. No. 70-513 (1970) CCH EEOC Dec. 6114
(holding that employer violated Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination by
refusing to pay death benefits to surviving spouses of deceased female employees
while paying such benefits to surviving spouses of male employees,).
36. See, e.g., Pers. Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
37. See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331-32 (invalidating prison height and
weight requirements for employment of guards because they disproportionately
excluded women and were not justified by business necessity); Wambheim v. J.C.
Penney Co., 642 F.2d 362, 365-66 (Cal. 1981) (finding that employer's head-of-
household rule, which allowed employees of both sexes to receive dependent
medical benefits coverage for dependents if employee earned more than 50 percent
of combined income of spouses, had a disproportionate impact on women); see also
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1999). In a disparate impact claim, practices that
are discriminatory in operation are illegal as well. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32.
38. The employer merely has the burden of production. The burden then shifts
back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reasons are mere pretext for
discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) which states that "An unlawful employment
practice based on disparate impact is established. . . if a complaining party
demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes
a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and
respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity .... " "Demonstrate" is
defined as meeting the burden of production and persuasion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m)
(2000).
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disparate impact. 39
Title VII also creates affirmative defenses for employers. 40 In
disparate treatment and impact claims, the employer will win if it
can show that the sex-based characteristic is "a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise." 41 For
disparate impact claims, employers will win if they can prove that
"the challenged practice is job-related for the position in question
and consistent with business necessity."42
B. Title VII's Application to Benefits Exclusions and the
History of the PDA
Title VII was originally enacted to address discrimination on
the basis of race and color.43 At the last minute, sex was added as
a protected category in an attempt to derail the bill's passage.
44
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii). Typically, the rebuttal focuses on the
quantitative aspects of the harm (i.e. how many men compared to women are hired,
fired, or promoted). The employer may challenge the statistics used to show this
disparity (such as whether the relevant pool of people was used for comparison,
methods of gathering data, etc.). See, e.g., AFSCME v. Doherty, 169 F.3d 1068,
1070, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1999) (describing that plaintiff presented evidence that an
employer's layoff criteria disproportionately harmed black employees, and
defendant tried to rebut plaintiff's evidence by showing that plaintiff had not
accounted for all persons who were subject to the challenged practice). The
employer may also challenge the plaintiffs claim about the significance of the
disparity and whether it is enough to trigger a Title VII violation. Id.
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (explaining unlawful employment practices).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). The Section provides that:
[l]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire
and employ employees ... or for an employer ... controlling
apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or
employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of his religion,
sex or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
Id. The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense is available for both
disparate impact and treatment claims; however, it is not available for claims of
discrimination on the basis of race or color. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). The defense of business necessity is only
available for disparate impact claims. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(2). There are three other
possible defenses, but these only apply to professional development tests, bona fide
seniority systems, and bona fide merit and piecework systems. See id. § 2000e-2(h).
43. See generally Rhonda M. Reaves, One of These Things is Not Like the Other:
Analogizing Ageism to Racism in Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 U. RICH. L.
REV. 839, 848-49 (2004).
44. See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268-69 (W.D.
Wash. 2001) (discussing the addition of "sex" to Title VII). See generally Jo
Freeman, How "Sex" Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Matter of
Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163 (1991); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on
Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1283-84 (1991).
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This attempt failed, and Title VII passed with sex included;
however, there was no meaningful legislative discussion about the
problems of sex discrimination in employment, the forms such
discrimination took, or how it should be addressed.45 Eventually,
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
was charged to undertake a comprehensive study of these issues,
and in 1972 it issued guidelines about what types of practices
constituted Title VII violations. 46 The EEOC identified the
unequal administration of health benefits as a form of
discrimination against women, and it issued guidelines requiring
employers to treat pregnancy the same as other conditions
suffered by men and women for purposes of health and other
benefit plans. 47 Based on these guidelines, women's advocates
were optimistic that they could successfully challenge pregnancy-
based exclusions under Title VII, 4 8 that is, until the Supreme
Court issued a setback to these challenges in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert.49
1. How Gilbert Led to the Birth of the PDA
In Gilbert, plaintiffs challenged an employer's benefit plan
that excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from an otherwise
comprehensive short-term disability policy under Title VII, based
on both disparate treatment and impact claims.50 In a divided
opinion, the Court held that the exclusion did not constitute a sex-
45. See Newport News Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 679-80 (1983) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 2, 8 (1978) and S. REP. No. 95-331, at 7-8 (1977) (remarks
of Sens. Williams, Javits, Mathias, Bayh and Reps. Sarasin and Hawkins); 124
CONG. REC. 21436 (1978); 123 CONG. REC. 10581, 29387, 39647, 29655 (1977)).
46. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-328, at 8 (1972). Interpretive guidelines were
published in the Federal Register on April 20, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 23804-808 (1979).
47. See 29 C.F.R. §1604.10(b) (promulgated 1975) providing that:
[D]isabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes,
temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or
temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection
with employment .... [Benefits] shall be applied to disability due to
pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are
applied to other temporary disabilities.
Id.
48. See Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 335-
36 (1985).
49. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); see id. at 145-46.
50. Id. at 127-28. Each of the respondents was pregnant and employed by
General Electric in either 1971 or 1972, and each presented and was denied a claim
for disability benefits to cover the period absent from work as a result of pregnancy.
Id. at 128-29.
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based classification under either theory.51 The majority's opinion
focused on the disparate treatment claim and rejected it on
primarily two grounds: (1) the lack of identity between the
excluded benefits and gender; and (2) the facial parity that existed
between men and women for the categories of benefits that were
covered.52
The majority found that because not all women would be
adversely affected by the exclusion, there was a lack of identity
between the pregnancy exclusions and gender. 53 The Court
treated the classification as between pregnant and non-pregnant
persons, the latter category containing both men and women. 54
Only pregnant women would be adversely affected, but non-
pregnant women would be treated the same as men. The Court
also found facial parity for men and women as there was no
condition for which men were covered while women were not.55
According to the majority, the fact that only women suffered the
uncovered risk of pregnancy-related disability benefits was due to
the biological fact that only women get pregnant; it was not due to
intentional discrimination by the employer. 56 In a confusing part
of the opinion that was essentially a restatement of its disparate
treatment analysis, the Court also held that there was no
disparate impact. 57
The Court concluded that because the policy exclusion did not
constitute disparate treatment or impact, the plaintiff bore the
burden of proving that the pregnancy exclusion was a mere
pretext designed to effectuate an invidious discrimination against
women.58 According to the majority, the plaintiffs could not make
this showing, despite an established history of explicit
51. Id. at 145-46.
52. Id. at 132-36. The Court borrowed the reasoning of a decision rejecting a
similar challenge to a public employer's exclusion on equal protection grounds. Id.
(adopting the reasoning of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)). In Geduldig v.
Aiello, a similar disability program established under California law was
challenged on the grounds that the benefit plan's exclusion of disability due to
pregnancy constituted sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 417 U.S. at 494-95. The Court rejected this
claim holding that such pregnancy-based classifications do not constitute invidious
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
53. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion followed
Geduldigs conclusion regarding pregnancy rights. See id. at 133-34.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 137-40.
56. Id. at 138-39.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 136.
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discrimination against female employees by the defendant. 59 The
Court accepted the argument that the exclusion was justified
because pregnancy was significantly different from the typical
covered disease or disability.60 The fact that pregnancy is "often
voluntary and desired," as opposed to being an unwanted "disease"
was one of the justifications accepted by the court.61
The majority's opinion sparked a stinging dissent, which
criticized the majority for failing to think critically about the
nature of the disability as sex-linked since only women would be
affected by it.62 The dissent argued that the majority improperly
focused on formal neutrality based on the parity of covered
conditions and failed to look more comprehensively at the nature
of the exclusions. 63 Rather than focusing on the equal inclusion of
mutual risks, the majority should have compared the treatment of
sex-specific conditions in order to determine the
comprehensiveness of coverage for men versus women. 64 Using
this approach, the dissent found the plan discriminatory on its
face because it insured risks that were specific to the male
reproductive system, such as prostatectomies, vasectomies, and
circumcisions, but excluded pregnancy, a condition unique to
women.
65
This led to the dissent's final criticism of the majority's
analysis that the majority failed to critically examine the
employer's history of discrimination against women in
determining whether the exclusion was truly the result of a
gender-neutral risk-assignment process. 66 For example, evidence
showed that initially, General Electric did not even offer a benefit
plan to female employees, because it believed that "women did not
recognize the responsibilities of life [and] probably were hoping to
get married soon and leave the company."67 For the dissent, the
sex-linked nature of the condition, coupled with the history of
discrimination and stereotyping about female employees having




62. Id. at 148-49.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 152-53.
65. The dissent also cited to the EEOC guidelines for support that a pregnancy
based exclusion constitutes a sex-based classification under Title VII. Id. at 157-58.
66. Id. at 148-50.
67. Id. at 150 n.1.
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exclusion was a sex-based classification in violation of Title VII.6s
The dissent's view ultimately prevailed and in 1978, in
response to Gilbert, Congress amended Title VII through the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.69 The PDA amended the
definition of discrimination to provide the following:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes,
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work .... This subsection shall not require an
employer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion,
except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the
fetus were carried to term, or except where medical
complications have arisen from an abortion .... 70
2. What the PDA Meant for Title VII Challenges to Benefits
Exclusions
The PDA overturned Gilbert by "[making] clear that it is
discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably
than other medical conditions."71 This was acknowledged in 1983
by the Supreme Court in Newport News Dock Co. v. EEOC. 72
Newport News was significant, however, because in its discussion
of the PDA, the Court established two critical principles that
should guide our application of Title VII and the PDA in
68. Id. at 153. The dissent concluded:
If the decision of this case, therefore, turns upon acceptance of the Court's
view of General Electric's disability plan as a sex-neutral assignment of
risks, or plaintiffs' perception of the plan as a sex-conscious process
expressive of the secondary status of women in the company's labor force,
the history of General Electric's employment practices and the absence of
definable gender neutral sorting criteria under the plan warrant rejection
of the Court's view in deference to the plaintiffs'. Indeed, the fact that the
Court's frame of references lends itself to such intentional, sex-laden
decision-making makes clear the wisdom and propriety of the EEOC's
contrary approach to employment disability programs.
Id.
69. See Newport News Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 679 (1983) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 95-948, 2nd Sess. at 2, 8 (1978) and S. REP. No. 95-331, at 7-8 (1977); 124
CONG. REC. 21436 (1978); 123 CONG. REC. 10581, 29387, 39647, 29655 (1977)
(remarks of Sens. Williams, Javits, Mathias, Bayh and Reps. Sarasin and
Hawkins)).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
71. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684.
72. See id. at 669. This is the only other case decided by the Supreme Court




challenges to other benefits exclusions.
In Newport News, the plaintiff challenged an employer-
sponsored medical plan that provided the same hospitalization
coverage for female and male employees, but different coverage for
their spouses.7 3 The spouses of female employees were covered for
hospitalization for all illnesses and other medical conditions, but
the plan capped the amount of hospitalization benefits for
pregnancy reimbursable for the spouses of male employees.7 4 The
Court concluded that coverage was less comprehensive on the
basis of sex because only pregnancy-related benefits were capped,
while non pregnancy-related benefits were not.7 5 Specifically, the
Court found that because the employer provided less
comprehensive coverage for male employees' dependents than for
female employees' dependents, the plan did not even "pass the
simple test of Title VII discrimination [enunciated before the
PDA] ."76
The Court went further to note that, through the enactment
of the PDA, Congress "unequivocally" rejected the reasoning in
Gilbert, including the facial parity test of discrimination employed
by the Gilbert majority. 77 It emphasized courts' duty to compare
the employer's treatment of sex-specific benefits among men and
women to determine whether the employer is providing
"comprehensive coverage" for both.7 8 Through its rejection of the
Gilbert majority's opinion, the Newport News Court established
two important principles underlying Title VII and the PDA. First,
it left no doubt that antidiscrimination law is an appropriate and
viable tool for challenging benefits exclusions. One of the quirks
in Title VII challenges to benefits exclusions is that, typically,
benefit plans do not contain an explicit classification for the entire
class of women or men. Rather these plans involve line-drawing
about the type of medical conditions and treatments that will be
covered. The PDA makes clear that this will not insulate such
exclusions from Title VII scrutiny. One of the most important
73. Id. at 670.
74. Id. at 670-72.
75. Id. at 682-83.
76. Id. at 683-84. The test referred to is the one enunciated in L.A. Department
of Water & Power v. Manhart. See supra notes 34, 36 and accompanying text; see
also Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
77. See also Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676, 679 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-948,
2nd Sess. at 2, 8 (1978) and S. REP. No. 95-331, at 7-8 (1977) (remarks of Sens.
Williams, Javits, Mathias, Bayh and Reps. Sarasin and Hawkins); 124 CONG. REC.
21436 (1978); 123 CONG. REC. 10581, 29387, 39647, and 29655 (1977)).
78. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676.
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principles established by the PDA and affirmed by the Supreme
Court in a number of decisions is that existing inequalities in the
insurance or health care industry cannot merely be absorbed into
an employment-based health system under Title VIIJ
9
Second, Newport News affirms that exclusions of pregnancy-
related benefits should be scrutinized closely because such
exclusions can be easy proxies for discrimination and are likely
motivated by gender bias. Indeed, both the 1972 EEOC guidelines
and the legislative history of the PDA rely heavily on the fact that
gender discrimination in employment has historically centered on
women's ability to become pregnant and biases about a woman's
right to control her fertility.8 0
While the PDA appears to have established such powerful
guiding principles, these principles have been at best watered-
down, and at worst ignored or rejected by lower courts wrestling
with challenges to other reproductive health benefits exclusions.
Courts appear to have difficulty understanding how other
reproductive health exclusions fit into a framework which arose
out of a concern about traditional employment discrimination
against pregnant women. Admittedly, the Gilbert and Newport
News scenarios present the easy case. In each one, the benefit
exclusion was for pregnancy, a unique, sex-based condition. 81
However, prescription contraception and infertility exclusions
present a challenge because each has gender-specific and gender-
neutral elements.8 2 In Parts II and III, I will demonstrate why
express policy exclusions of prescription contraception and
infertility should, at a minimum, constitute a prima facie case of
sex discrimination under Title VII, and why such exclusions are
likely motivated by the type of gender bias that Title VII and the
PDA were enacted to eliminate.8 3
79. See Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp.
Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1073, 1083, 1088 (1983) (holding that Title VII
requires treatment of employees as individuals, not class members); Newport News,
462 U.S. at 669, 685; Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (noting that Title VII has no
affirmative defense for price discrimination by cost justification).
80. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 157-59; see also Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676, 679
(citing Congress H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 2nd Sess. at 2, 8 (1978) and S. REP. No. 95-
331, at 7-8 (1977); 124 CONG. REC. 21436 (1978); 123 CONG. REC. 10581, 29387,
39647, 29655 (1977) (remarks of Sens. Williams, Javits, Mathias, Bayh and Reps.
Sarasin and Hawkins)).
81. See supra notes 50-57, 73-78 and accompanying text (describing the cases in
detail).
82. See infra notes 85-120 and accompanying text (discussing contraception and
infertility and how each relates to men and women).
83. See infra notes 85-232 and accompanying text.
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II. Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact in
Prescription Contraception and Fertility Exclusions
A comprehensive background of the forms and effects of
treatment designed to control fertility is necessary in order to
understand how apparently gender-neutral reproductive health
exclusions can result in different treatment of, or effects on,
women and men.8 4
A. Medical Information and Insurance Coverage Trends of
Prescription Contraceptives and Infertility
1. Prescription Contraception
The primary purpose of prescription contraception is to
prevent conception,8 5 however, certain types of contraception can
serve other purposes as well. In women, the birth control pill
helps to prevent ovarian and endometrial cancer and provides
relief from menstrual symptoms, such as irregular bleeding and
severe cramping.8 6 For both men and women, barrier methods of
contraception, such as the diaphragm and male and female
condoms, help prevent the spread of sexually transmitted
disease.8 7
Prescription contraception comes in several different forms
including the birth control pill, the diaphragm, intrauterine
devices (IUDs), and Norplant (capsules implanted into the
woman's skin containing the hormone progestin).8 8 These forms of
contraception are only available to women and are reversible.
Surgical sterilization, a form of contraception available to men
through vasectomies and women through tubal ligations, entails
greater risk than the other forms of contraception and is
considered irreversible.8 9 Statistics from a study published in
84. See infra notes 84-232 and accompanying text.
85. See Jill L. Schwartz & Henry L. Gabelnick, Current Contraceptive Research,
34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 30 (2002), available at
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals /3431002.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
86. Ronald Burkmann et al., Safety Concerns and Health Benefits Associated
with Oral Contraception, 190 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 55, 512-15 (2004).
The article lists other emerging benefits of oral contraception as well. See id. at
515-19.
87. Swartz & Gabelnick, supra note 85, at 310. These methods are less effective
than others at preventing pregnancy. See Contraceptive Method Effectiveness,
Engengeredhealth.org, at http://www.engenderhealth.org/wh/fp/ceff.html#barrier
(last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
88. See Swartz & Gabelnick, supra note 85, at 310-15.
89. Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73
[Vol. 23:299
ERICKSON V. BARTELL DRUG CO.
1998 show that 49 percent of traditional indemnity plans covered
no reversible prescription contraceptives, with only 15 percent of
plans covering all of the most commonly used methods. 90
Ironically, many of these plans covered sterilization for men and
women.91
The coverage of prescription contraception has undergone
quite a change over the last several years due in part to the
emergence of managed care. In recent years, many states have
also enacted laws mandating insurance coverage of all FDA-
approved prescription contraceptives where the insurer covers
other prescription drugs.92 Nonetheless, gaps in coverage persist.
For example, some states only mandate coverage for certain types
of contraceptives or require only that insurers give employers the
option of purchasing contraceptive coverage, which employers
often reject. 93 In addition, many of these laws only apply to
certain types of insurers, such as health maintenance
organizations (HMO) or plans for individuals or small groups. 94
Thus, many fee-for-service plans still do not provide coverage for
contraception, forcing employees to choose between an HMO with
prescription contraceptive coverage and a traditional fee-for-
service plan without it. Finally, even where states have mandated
coverage, state laws may not apply because of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 95 a federal law
that regulates employment-based benefits and which has been
interpreted to exempt self-insured employers from state mandates
for benefits.96
2. Infertility Treatment
Infertility is defined as the inability to conceive after one year
of unprotected sexual intercourse or the inability of the woman to
carry a pregnancy to term due to some breakdown in the
WASH. L. REV. 363, 368-69 (1998).
90. ALAN GUrrmACHER INST., UNEVEN & UNEQUAL: INSURANCE COVERAGE AND
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES 4 (1995) [hereinafter UNEVEN & UNEQUAL].
91. Id. at 9, 12.
92. Id. at 9.
93. Id.; see also Eve Gartner, Plaintiffs Counsel in Erickson v. Bartell, Remarks
at the American Association of Law School Employment Law Panel Discussion on
Coverage of Prescription Contraception (Jan. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Gartner's
Remarks].).
94. UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 90, at 9.
95. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
96. Rebecca Porter, EEOC Rules Employers Must Cover Contraceptives, TRIAL,
Mar. 2001, at 94.
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reproductive process of either the woman, man, or both. 97
Identifying the source of the problem and appropriate treatment
can be very complex. The successful functioning of the
reproductive process depends on many factors. Specifically, men
must be able to produce healthy sperm, deliver this sperm to the
woman for fertilization, and the sperm must be able to fertilize the
egg upon meeting.98 Women must be able to produce healthy eggs,
have unblocked fallopian tubes that allow the sperm to reach the
egg, and have the ability to allow the fertilized egg to become
implanted in their uterus.99 Infertility can occur when any part of
this process is not working. 100 Practically, this means that in some
cases the woman never achieves pregnancy; in others, the woman
becomes pregnant, but cannot carry the baby to term, resulting in
miscarriage. 101
In both women and men, problems in the reproductive
process can be either hormonal or structural or both.10 2 About 40
percent of the time, female infertility problems result from
ovulation or hormonal disorders, such as irregular periods or
decreased ovulation. 103 Infertility can also be the result of
structural damage to the reproductive organs, such as a surgery in
the pelvic area causing scar tissue and damage to the fallopian
tubes.10 4
For men, infertility can occur in one of two main areas: sperm
production or sperm delivery. 105 Production problems result
primarily from damaged or malformed testicles or structural
abnormalities in the varicocele, duct of the epididymis, vas
97. THE STAFF OF RESOLVE & DIANE ARONSON, RESOLVING INFERTILITY:
UNDERSTANDING THE OPTIONS AND CHOOSING SOLUTIONS WHEN YOU WANT TO
HAVE A BABY 5 (1999) [hereinafter RESOLVING INFERTILITY]. This definition of
infertility assumes heterosexual intercourse, which has implications for the rights
of same sex couples and single individuals who desire infertility treatment. While
the issue of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and marital status is
beyond the scope of this Article, see Lisa C. Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, the Too Fertile,
and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1007 (1996) for an important discussion of this
topic.
98. See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 97, at 34.
99. See id. at 21-30.
100. See id. at 5.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 89-174.
103. Id. at 89. For a detailed discussion of such hormonal disorders, see id. at 89-
119.
104. See id. at 15, 121-53. Structural damage can also be caused by sexually
transmitted diseases.
105. See id. at 30.
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deferens, or ejaculatory ducts. 106 Male infertility may also be
developmental or caused by an unrelated illness such as a sexually
transmitted disease, kidney disease, or mumps. 107 Fertility
problems in men are hormonal only about 10 percent of the
time. 108
Infertility can be caused by medical treatment for unrelated
problems. For example, one common cause of infertility is cancer
treatment, such as chemotherapy or radiation. 109 Exposure to
other environmental toxins or harmful substances, such as alcohol,
tobacco, caffeine, and certain illicit drugs can also impair
infertility.110 Finally, age can be a factor affecting infertility in
men and women.111
Different treatments are used either to correct or bypass
infertility depending on the source of the problem. Infertility
treatment generally falls into three main categories: (1) testing
designed to diagnose and monitor infertility problems and
treatment (for example, ovulation kits, blood/semen analysis,
ultrasound); 112 (2) treatment designed to correct the actual
structural or functional problem that is the source of the infertility
(for example, fertility drugs used to correct hormonal imbalance in
men or women or surgery to correct endometriosis in women or
blocked vas deferens in men);113 (3) treatment designed to aid
reproduction without sexual intercourse (for example, in vitro
106. See id. at 159-70. A varicocele is a bundle of enlarged veins in the scrotum.
Id. They can impede sperm production due to increased blood to the area and an
increase in temperature, which can only be discovered through a diagnostic work
up. Id. Forty percent of infertile males have a varicocele. Id.; see also Fran Worrall,
Male Infertility 'A Common Problem' But Treatable, ATLANTA J. CONST., June 10,
2003, available at http://www.ajc.com/health/content/health/special/0603/
10infertility.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
107. Worrall, supra note 106.
108. RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 97, at 30.
109. "DES daughters" experienced infertility for a different reason. Id. at 15.
These are women whose mothers were prescribed the drug Diethylstilbestrol (DES)
while pregnant to lower the risk of miscarriage. Id. Unfortunately, it caused severe
medical problems later in life for the daughters exposed to the drug in utero,
including genital cancer and fertility problems. Id.
110. See id. at 15. For example, many workplace hazards, such as prolonged or
extensive exposure to lead, chlorinated hydrocarbons, and ionizing radiation, can
damage the reproductive system. Id.
111. See id. at 14, 148-49. Both sperm motility and egg production tend to
decrease with age, though for women the decline is much more dramatic. Id.
112. See id. at 63-88 (describing the first steps in infertility treatment).
113. The term "fertility drugs" describes the hormonal preparations used to treat
female infertility, either to stimulate ovulation or support the uterine lining in
women where the problem is implantation or failure to carry the pregnancy to term.
GEOFFREY SHER ET AL., THE A.R.T. OF MAKING BABIES 201 (1998). However, some
of these drugs are also used to enhance male sperm function and production. Id.
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fertilization (IVF)).114
Diagnosing and monitoring infertility can be a very involved
process and requires sex-specific treatment for men and women.
For men, testing focuses on the prostate examination and semen
analysis. 115 For women, the diagnosis usually involves more
extensive and invasive testing, that may include a pelvic
examination, repeated testing to monitor body temperature and
ovulation, transvaginal ultrasound, and x-ray of the fallopian
tubes and uterus. 116
Treatment to correct or bypass infertility is even more varied
and complex. Conventional treatments, including lifestyle
changes (losing weight, cessation of certain drugs or alcohol, etc.),
surgery, or fertility drugs are generally recommended before
resorting to assisted reproductive technology. 117 Assisted
Reproductive Technology (ART) describes "all treatments or
procedures that involve the handling of human eggs and sperm for
the purpose of helping a woman become pregnant."' 18  In-vitro
fertilization (IVF) is the most commonly known ART, and can be
used to bypass infertility problems in cases where conventional
treatment may not be effective. 119 While IVF focuses on the
woman, it can be used to bypass either male or female infertility or
114. In some cases, infertility may be due to an infection or disease that could be
transmitted from the father or mother to the fetus. Assisted reproductive
technology can serve an important purpose in these cases, since it enables
reproduction while preventing the spread of HIV to the mother and fetus where the
father is HIV-positive. See Highlights in Fertility & Sterility: For Couples Trying to
Conceive When the Male Partner is H1V-Positive, Enhanced Technique Provides
Greater Assurance that Washed Sperm is Virus-Free (2002), American Society for
Reproductive Medicine, at http://www.asrm.org/Professionals/Fertility&Sterility/
highlightslhighlights.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
115. See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 97, at 80-87 (describing the
complete medical workup performed on men).
116. See id. at 63-80 (describing the complete medical workup performed on
women).
117. See id. at 176-96 (explaining Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) and
the decision-making process before undertaking ART). Despite the prominence of
IVF, according to statistics by American Society for Reproductive Medicine, it
currently accounts for less than 3 percent of all infertility treatment in the U.S. AM.
SOC'Y OF REPROD. MED., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT INFERTILITY, at
http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2005). About 85 to 90
percent of most infertility cases are treated with drug treatment or surgical repair
of reproductive organs. Id.
118. RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 97, at 175 (citing the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention).
119. In IVF, eggs are surgically removed from the ovary and mixed with sperm
outside the body in a petri dish. Id. at 176. If the eggs become fertilized, they are
then surgically implanted into the woman's uterus. Id.
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both. 120
Employers and insurance companies have a great deal of
discretion regarding coverage of infertility benefits because only
fourteen states have laws regulating coverage. 121 However, these
laws merely require insurers either to cover or offer some form of
infertility diagnosis and treatment. 122 Thus, infertility treatment
exclusions vary by employer and the type of treatment excluded is
not always clear from the express terms of the exclusion. 123 For
example, many insurance plans cover testing to diagnose the cause
of infertility, but exclude treatment designed to correct the
problem or monitor a woman's health during treatment. 124 Some
plans only exclude assisted reproductive technology procedures,
such as TVF.125 Many plans have blanket exclusions for infertility
treatment, the effects of which are not clear cut. These provisions
appear to exclude any service or device relating to fertility;
however, where the medical condition causing infertility may have
other harmful effects, treatment may be covered as necessary for
reasons unrelated to fertility. 26 Surgery for structural problems
120. For example, one article describes a man born without a right or left vas
deferens, the tubes that transport sperm from the testicles to the urethra. See
Worrall, supra note 106. This problem occurred as a result of his cystic fibrosis. Id.
In this case, the man's body was producing sperm but had no way to transport it to
fertilize an egg. Id. So he and his wife underwent IVF using a procedure called
intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) in which sperm are retrieved via needle
aspiration and individually injected into a female's mature eggs. Id. The eggs were
successfully fertilized and implanted. Id.
121. AM. SOC'Y OF REPROD. MED., STATE INFERTILITY INSURANCE LAWS, supra
note 117 (noting that the states are: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode
Island, Texas and West Virginia). An example of very protective legislation is a
New Jersey statute which states that a hospital service corporation that provides
pregnancy benefits cannot be issued unless it includes medically necessary
expenses for the diagnosis and treatment of infertility. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x
(West 2001). It must include, without limitation, diagnostic testing, medication,
surgery, artificial insemination, IVF, embryo transfer, GIFT, ZIFT, and ICSI. Id.
Covered treatments involving egg retrieval are limited to persons who have tried
all reasonable, less expensive medically appropriate treatments, but who are still
unable to become pregnant or carry a pregnancy. Id. There is a limit of four egg
retrievals per patient and retrievals are only covered for patients forty-five years
old or younger. Id.
122. AM. SOCkY OF REPROD. MED. , supra note 117.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See infra notes 280-292 and accompanying text (discussing a case in which
the insurance policy at issue specifically exempted IVF).
126. See infra notes 251-294 and accompanying text (discussing Krauel v. Iowa
Methodist Med. Ctr. and Saks v. Covey). For example, endometriosis is a condition
in women that can cause other severe health problems including excessive bleeding
and pelvic pain. SHER ET AL., supra note 113, at 200. Thus a plan that expressly
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falls into this category and will often be covered despite express
infertility exclusions. Treatment such as fertility drugs, ovulation
kits, and IVF, however, would be excluded. 127
B. Satisfying the Prima Facie Case for Title VII as Amended
by the PDA
1. Is the Policy Facially Discriminatory?
Under the test of discrimination first enunciated by the
Gilbert dissent, and subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court
in Newport News, an exclusion that only affects one sex is a sex-
based classification. 128 Thus, where an employer excludes only
forms of fertility treatment and contraception available to women,
a disparate treatment claim can be made out. In the case of
prescription contraception, this means that plaintiffs could easily
challenge many of the insurance plans described above on
disparate treatment grounds because they exclude only forms used
by women, while covering surgical procedures used by men and
women. 129 The differential treatment becomes even clearer when
we consider the non-contraceptive purposes of the "birth control"
pill, such as tempering the symptoms of menstruation and acting
as a preventive measure against certain types of cancer. 130 In
these circumstances, excluding the pill from coverage means that
women are denied medically necessary treatment, whereas men
would have access to treatment for a comparable condition. 131 In
light of these trends, it seems unnecessary to consider a disparate
impact claim for prescription contraceptive exclusions. However,
if a plan excludes all prescription contraceptive treatment, not just
that used by women, the link between gender and excluded
treatment required by Title VII seems tenuous. Moreover,
focusing on the form of treatment as sex-linked may be limiting in
the future, since advances in technology may make prescription
excludes infertility treatments may still cover surgery to correct endometriosis.
Where a man suffers from impotence, Viagra and penile implants may still be
covered as medically necessary to alleviate sexual dysfunction, regardless of its
relationship to infertility.
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 32-82 and accompanying text (describing Title VII and the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
129. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., infra notes 236-243 and accompanying text (discussing a case in
which the plaintiff sued for reimbursement of the costs for birth control pills to
treat hormonal imbalance).
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contraception available to men and women. 132 Therefore, a
disparate impact argument should be considered. 133
Infertility exclusions in policies probably could not be
challenged as facially discriminatory because, as noted above,
most are blanket exclusions that affect men and women. 134 An
argument has been made that policies excluding only assisted
reproductive technology are facially discriminatory because the
excluded treatment is technically only performed on women. This
argument is unlikely to be successful, however, because it relies on
an incomplete picture of assisted reproductive technology (ART)
which is used to circumvent both male and female fertility
problems and often encompasses procedures that involve the
male.1 35 Consequently, a disparate impact claim is more suitable
for challenging such exclusions. 136
2. Do Reproductive Health Exclusions Create a Disparate
Impact on Women?
a. Cost
The most obvious claim of disparate impact for both
prescription contraception and infertility exclusions is based on
cost. The forms of prescription contraception excluded are either
exclusively or predominantly those used by women, creating a
greater burden on women who bear the cost of treatment-
approximately $300 to $500 per year. 37 While this amount may
seem insignificant, for many women it is prohibitive. 138 As I will
132. See generally Male Contraceptive Tests Positive, CNN, Oct. 6, 2003, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/HEALTH/10/06/male.pilI (last visited Mar. 8, 2005)
(stating that it would be five to ten years before a male contraceptive was available
commercially); Your Health-Male Contraceptive Pill on the Horizon?, CNN, Sept. 8,
2000, at http://archives.cnn.com/2000/HEALTH/09/08/your.health.male/ (last
visited Mar. 3, 2005) (predicting that a male contraceptive pill could be available by
2005).
133. See infra notes 137-196 and accompanying text (undertaking a disparate
impact analysis).
134. See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
135. One example is where sperm aspiration or extraction procedures are used to
retrieve sperm. See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 97, at 187 (explaining that
when the man cannot produce sperm in his ejaculate, invasive procedures can be
used to obtain the sperm directly from the testicle (Testicular Sperm Extraction) or
from the epididymis (Microsurgical Epididymal Sperm Aspiration)).
136. See infra notes 137-196 and accompanying text (considering a disparate
impact claim relating to infertility treatment coverage).
137. See Schwartz & Gabelnick, supra note 85, at 310 (describing the possible
costs of oral contraceptives and other forms of female birth control).
138. There are several studies that demonstrate that lack of insurance coverage
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discuss below, where the cost of prescription contraception is
prohibitive, the result is an even more serious harm--denial of
treatment to prevent conception effectively.
At first glance, it may be less obvious that infertility
exclusions create disparate cost effects because, unlike pregnancy,
infertility exclusions affect men and women. Measuring
disparities in cost to women and men for infertility treatment is
difficult since it depends in part on the nuances of the particular
insurance plan and data about the costs of various types of
treatment. From the above discussion, however, it should be clear
that even blanket exclusions of infertility treatment can result in a
greater financial burden on women. First, women have to undergo
many more tests and procedures in the process of diagnosis and
treatment, even when male infertility is the source of the
problem. 139 Second, even blanket exclusions are practically more
likely to exclude treatment for female-infertility, such as fertility
drugs to correct hormonal problems, than male-specific treatment.
This is because surgery used to correct structural problems, which
is more often the cause of male infertility, can conceivably be
covered as necessary to treat a medical condition unrelated to
infertility. 40 The result of this differential treatment is significant
since infertility is hormonal in women 30 percent of the time, but
only about 10 percent of the time in men.141 Thus, despite the
apparent facial neutrality, there can be disparate cost effects that
fall more harshly on women.
affects one's access to treatment. See, e.g., ALINA SALGANICOFF ET AL., KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. & CTR. FOR HEALTH POLY RES., WOMEN'S HEALTH IN THE UNITED
STATES: HEALTH COVERAGE AND ACcESS TO CARE vii (May 2002) (finding that costs
related to health care and prescription drugs present significant barriers for
women); Law, supra note 89, at 368-69 (discussing a 1998 study by the Alan
Guttmacher Institute showing that sterilization was the most commonly used form
of contraception in the United States, despite the fact that the birth control pill is
an effective, reversible and safe form of contraception, and that this is probably due
to the fact that more plans covered sterilization and failed to cover other methods of
birth control); Schwartz & Gabelnick, supra note 85; see also McRae v. Califano,
491 F. Supp. 630, 668-73, 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). But see, e.g., Ernest F. Lidge III, An
Employer's Exclusion of Coverage for Contraceptive Drugs is Not Per Se Sex
Discrimination, 76 TEMPLE L. REV. 533, 568 (2003) (arguing that the cost
differential probably is not a significant enough disparity to make out a Title VII
claim).
139. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
140. See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 97, at 64 (1999) (describing that
structural deficiencies that were not only linked to fertility are more prevalent in
male infertility than female infertility).
141. Id.
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b. Health Effects
Exclusions of prescription contraception and infertility
treatments can also result in very serious health risks for women.
The failure to prevent conception has obvious unique physical
effects on women since only women get pregnant and suffer the
physical risks that accompany pregnancies. Where a patient has a
medical condition or illness that would be aggravated by carrying
a fetus to term, contraception would be necessary not only to
prevent pregnancy, but also to protect the woman's health or
life. 142
Even where a patient does not have a medical condition that
could be aggravated by pregnancy, the ability to prevent and
control the timing of pregnancy is an important health issue for
women. For example, studies show a link between unintended
pregnancy and rates of infant mortality and morbidity.143 Studies
also point to the disproportionate toll unwanted pregnancies take
on women socio-economically: a woman's inability to prevent
pregnancy can effectively undermine her attempts to become
stable economically and to control how and in what ways she will
contribute to society.144 Economic instability also explains the
higher risks to both mother and child's physical health in cases of
unwanted pregnancy since a lack of planning may mean that the
woman does not have the resources to respond to the demands of
pregnancy and infancy. Even where unintended pregnancies end
in abortion, women can suffer severe emotional, physical, and
financial burdens that men do not. 145
Less well known are the disparate health effects that occur
with infertility exclusions. 146 It is true that for both men and
women, there is a gender-neutral effect of the exclusion-denial of
treatment needed to correct or bypass an infertility problem. 47
142. See McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 670 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (describing
the number and types of illnesses that can be aggravated by pregnancy).
143. See Law, supra note 89, at 365-66.
144. Id. at 364-68
145. Id; see also ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., CONTRACEPTIVE USE: FACTS IN BRIEF,
at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb-contr-use.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2005)
[hereinafter CONTRACEPTIVE USE] ("Unintended pregnancies among women who do
not use a method of birth control are almost as likely to end in abortion as in
birth.").
146. The link between denial of coverage and access is also clear in the infertility
context. Statistics show that people needing IVF, for example, are not seeking it
due to lack of insurance. See Tarun Jain et al., Insurance Coverage and Outcomes
of In Vitro Fertilization, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 661 (2002).
147. At least one source argues that traditional options are only effective for
about 50 percent of infertile couples, but for the remaining 50 percent, IVF may be
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For both men and women, this denial can also create significant
emotional effects from the failure to have a child.148 Nonetheless,
there are gender-specific effects that result, and, as with
prescription contraception, the relationship of the treatment to
pregnancy plays a critical role in understanding these effects. 149
First, many individuals without infertility coverage choose to
pursue treatment despite the lack of insurance, paying out of
pocket.150 While this might appear to minimize claims of disparate
health effects, a recent study has shown that even in such cases,
women may suffer adverse health effects as a result of the
insurance exclusion. 15 In 2002, the New England Journal of
Medicine published the results of a study to determine the
utilization and outcomes of IVF services according to the status of
insurance coverage. 5 2 One of the most significant findings was
that lack of insurance coverage may adversely affect the type of
infertility treatment received by women, which could in turn
create potential health risks to women and their fetuses. 153
Researchers found that in states without mandated coverage for
IVF, a greater number of embryos were transferred per cycle and
there were higher rates of multiple births, especially of three or
more infants. 54 The authors speculated that in states without
mandated coverage, physicians may be transferring more embryos
per IVF cycle because of the financial pressure to achieve a
"successful" outcome the first time.' 55 Given the increased risk of
multiple births when more embryos are transferred per cycle, this
has significant implications for maternal and fetal health. First,
multiple births increase the short- and long-term health risks for
the pregnant woman, including premature labor, premature
delivery, pregnancy-induced hypertension, gestational diabetes,
the only recourse. See SHER ET AL., supra note 113, at 2-3. However, as noted
earlier, IVF currently only accounts for 3 percent of infertility treatments. See
supra note 117.
148. See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 97, at 40-42 (describing emotional
effects of inability to bear children).
149. See infra notes 151-160 and accompanying text.
150. See SALGANICOFF, supra note 138, at viii. But see JACK HADLEY, KAISER
COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE COST OF NOT COVERING THE
UNINSURED PROJECT 6 (May 2002) (noting that pregnant women may wait to
receive prenatal treatment until they have insurance).
151. See Jain et al., supra note 146, at 665 (describing the risks associated with
transferring more embryos per cycle, a practice more common in states that do not
require insurance coverage for LVF than those that do).
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and uterine hemorrhage. 156 Moreover, children born of multiple
births are at greater risk for respiratory distress, intracranial
hemorrhage, cerebral palsy, and blindness due to prematurity, as
well as increased risk of death, and physical, mental, and
developmental disabilities. 157
Alternatively, if denial of coverage causes individuals to forgo
treatment, women suffer additional consequences that men do not.
Where a woman is able to conceive, but cannot carry the
pregnancy to term, denying treatment means that the woman may
continue to suffer the health risks and emotional devastation of
repeated miscarriages.15 8 Regardless of whether the infertility
occurs in this way or results in an inability to conceive at all, some
have argued that there is still a unique consequence that results
from the woman's inability to have the physical and emotional
experience of pregnancy and ultimately to bear a child. 159 Both
men and women who have suffered through this process have
testified to the unique and particularly isolating pain that women
suffer, due in part to the reality that for many women, their self-
image and society's image of them is strongly tied to the ability to
have a child. 60
156. Id.
157. The study also noted that such policy exclusions have an indirect effect on
the quality of reproductive health care. Id. at 665. The normal trend for new
medical treatments that are costly in the beginning is that they become less costly
and more effective with more frequent use and the technology and physicians'
expertise are refined. One of the factors affecting utilization of medical treatment
is insurance coverage and reimbursement. This trend is no less true in the IVF
context. With insurance coverage comes increased utilization by patients, and as
demand increases, more clinics open and more procedures are performed, which
will ultimately lead to improved access and quality. Id. The authors of the study
note that currently, as a result of a lack of reimbursement, not many procedures
are being performed, and of those that are, they are spread among a number of
clinics that may be performing fewer than 100 procedures per year. Id. This leads
to questions about the quality of care being delivered. This has a unique health
effect on women since better quality care means reducing the number of IVF trials
and physical burdens for women, as well as helping to reduce multiple births which
pose health risks to women and their fetuses. Id; see also SHER ET AL., supra note
113, at 46.
158. ELLEN SARASOHN GLAZER, EXPERIENCING INFERTILITY: STORIES TO INFORM
AND INSPIRE 118-23 (1998).
159. See, e.g., ELLEN SARASOHN GLAZER & SUSAN LEWIS COOPER, WITHOUT
CHILD: EXPERIENCING AND RESOLVING INFERTILITY (1998) [hereinafter WITHOUT
CHILD].
160. See generally id. One man's testimony about his own experience bears this
out:
One of the most important realizations we came to out of our struggles was
that it is impossible to compare losses. It seems true, as much of the
research suggests, that women who do not become successfully pregnant
lose a more intimate and profound physical experience than do men who
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Thus, at a minimum, evidence of the forms of treatment
excluded and the disparate cost and health effects of reproductive
health exclusions should satisfy the prima facie case for a Title VII
violation and shift the burden to the employer to justify the
exclusions. This gives plaintiffs the opportunity to challenge such
justifications as pretext for bias.
III. Burden Shifting: Are Employers' Justifications a
Pretext for Gender Discrimination?
Exposing hidden bias is probably the biggest hurdle to
overcome in convincing courts that reproductive health exclusions
are really a proxy for gender discrimination. In Section A, I
explore the broad forms that gender discrimination has taken in
health care and employment contexts.' 6 ' Gender discrimination
has historically been rooted in an ideology of women's proper
reproductive and sexual roles, one that devalues women's sexual
freedom or prioritize career over childbearing. 162 Denying women
access to treatment that which enables them to have sex without
the consequences pregnancy and to control the timing of
pregnancy is a logical extension of this kind of discrimination.
Such covert bias may be difficult, if not impossible, for the plaintiff
to prove in most instances. This is precisely why the burden-
shifting component is so critical. In Section B, I will show how a
close examination of common justifications for such exclusions
further strengthens my contention that hidden bias, not legitimate
medical or policy distinctions, is the real motivating factor.163
A. Evidence of Bias in Health Care and Employment
1. The Health Care Industry
As already noted above, existing gender discrimination in the
insurance industry cannot merely be absorbed into an employer's
benefits scheme without violating Title VII. It is difficult to know
whether in fact this has happened simply by looking at the benefit
excluded. A closer look at the health care industry more broadly
provides context needed to understand how reproductive health
do not sire a child. There is also evidence to show that now, as in earlier
times, women are more stigmatized for a failure to bear children than are
men for not siring them.
Id. at 41.
161. See infra notes 164-206 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 164-196 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 207-232 and accompanying text.
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exclusions may be part of a larger pattern of discrimination
against women.
Numerous studies have documented gender discrimination,
conscious and subconscious, at all levels of health care, from the
exclusion of adequate numbers of women as clinical research
subjects 64 to disparities in the delivery of health care. 165 This
discrimination is most pronounced in the area of women's
reproductive health. 166 Prior to the PDA, many private and public
disability and health insurance plans treated pregnancy worse
than other medical conditions based on the notion that pregnancy
was not an illness or disease, but was a voluntary or desired
condition. 167 In this way, the significant medical effects and risks
involved in even normal pregnancies were overshadowed by the
characterization of pregnancy as a moral or personal "choice"
about whether to have a child.16
At the same time, a different trend was occurring in the
public benefits context. Social activists were successfully pushing
for laws that would provide support to indigents, and in this
context, the importance of ensuring access to pregnancy care was
prominent. 69 In fact, the health needs of pregnant women and
mothers were the focal point of public health and welfare laws
designed to protect women:
[A] review of major federal legislation related to women's
health show[s] that virtually all of women's health
entitlements and rights have revolved around women's roles
as bearers and caregivers of children. For example, at
different historical points, the federal government has
164. See Caroline W. Jacobus, Legislative Responses to Discrimination in
Women's Health Care: A Report Prepared for the Commission to Study Sex
Discrimination in the Statutes, 16 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 153, 312-13 (1995); Karen
H. Rothenberg, Gender Matters: Implications for Clinical Research and Women's
Health Care, 32 HOUs. L. REV. 1201, 1202-10 (1996).
165. See, e.g., Kevin A. Schulman et al., 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 618, 618-19
(1999) (discussing a controlled experiment finding that the race and sex of patients
influence how physicians manage chest pain); see also Carol Jonann Bess, Gender
Bias in Health Care: A Life or Death Issue for Women with Coronary Heart Disease,
6 HAST. WOMEN'S L.J. 41, 41-43 (1995); Jacobus, supra note 164, at 309-13;
Rothenberg, supra note 164, at 1210-17; Jacobus, supra note 164, at 309-13.
166. See Lisa A. Hayden, Gender Discrimination Within the Reproductive Health
Care System: Viagra v. Birth Control, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 171, 186-98 (1999);
Jacobus, supra note 164, at 267-71.
167. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 151 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part).
168. This clearly does not account for pregnancy due to rape or in circumstances
where the birth control method used was not successful.




promulgated laws which provide for limited entitlements for
women's prenatal care, for neonatal care and for the care of
young children. 17
0
This legislation largely neglected women's health needs
unrelated to their role as child bearers.' 71 For example, there were
no legislative mandates to cover prescription contraception, and
there were legislative prohibitions on the use of federal Medicaid
funds for abortions even where a physician considered it medically
necessary. 172 In fact, despite attempts, to date no federal
legislation has been enacted to require prescription contraception
or fertility treatment in employment-based plans.
It is also telling that reproductive health care such as
prescription contraception, infertility, and abortion have routinely
been labeled as not medically necessary, but rather a luxury or
lifestyle choice. 173 As with early distinctions made between
pregnancy and other medical conditions, the tendency has been to
ignore the health implications of denying treatment, and to only
focus on the aspect of the treatment that involves a personal
choice about family planning. While this tendency may be due to
ignorance of these health implications, a closer look reveals that
these labels are based more prominently on assumptions about
proper gender roles and the morality of women controlling their
fertility.
a. Birth Control and Sexuality: 'A Threat to Women's Virtue"
There is a long history of prescription contraceptive access
being denied in order to advance values about the morality of
women's sexual freedom. 174 In the early 1900s, for example, access
to birth control was threatened by the Federal Comstock law that
classified contraceptive information and supplies as obscene
170. Susan L. Waysdorf, Fighting for Their Lives: Women, Poverty, and the
Historical Role of United States Law in Shaping Access to Women's Health Care, 84
Ky. L.J. 745, 767 (1995-96).
171. See id. at 813 (arguing that "Medicaid has maintained the historic link
between public health care entitlement and women's fertility role").
172. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302, 326-27 (1980) (upholding
federal prohibition of Medicaid funds for abortions not necessary to save the life of
the mother or resulting from rape); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1976)
(upholding exclusion of funding for "non-therapeutic" abortions).
173. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
174. See generally TONE, supra note 169, at 4; Collection of Margaret Sanger
Papers, Birth Control and the Good Old Boys in Congress, Margaret Sanger Papers
Project Newsletter, #26 (2000-01) available at http://www.nyu.edulprojects/sanger
/goodold-boys.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).) [hereinafter Collection of Margaret
Sanger Papers].
[Vol. 23:299
ERICKSON V. BARTELL DRUG CO.
material and would have interfered with doctors' ability to
dispense birth control. 175 Advocates such as Margaret Sanger
attempted to get the law overturned by lobbying legislators, and in
doing so, learned that much of the support for the Comstock law
was due to legislators' concerns about how encouraging birth
control would affect the proper role of women in society, and in
particular women's sexuality.1 76 Sanger's notes from a meeting
with staffers revealed the following concerns by legislators:
"Opposed to bill-'conscientiously, because we have not the
right to deny the joy of life to millions;' morally and politically
we need 'more people.' Only way to control births is self-
control."
... said "he did not believe there would be any virtue among
women any longer if such a law was passed. He said that it
would tend to put men and women on the same standard and
he also felt that it would increase immorality by removing the
fear of pregnancy."
"Rather impossible [for him to support bill] at present time.
'I'm afraid I'm a little old fashioned on that. I'm not ready to
teach our children to become whores yet.'...
One of Sanger's strategies was to educate the public about
why prescription contraception was necessary to protect women's
health. Through her founding of the American Birth Control
League in 1921, a lobbying group organized to secure medical
acceptance of birth control on public health grounds, Sanger
worked to promote "physician-controlled contraception."'178 While
this medicalization of reproductive health was somewhat
successful, the view of access to prescription contraception as a
health issue, as opposed to a moral decision about sexual freedom,
has never been completely accepted. 179
175. Id. Collection of Margaret Sanger Papers, supra note 174.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. TONE, supra note 174, at 122, 130.
179. Sanger's attempt to educate the legislators on the "scientific and social
merits" of birth control couldn't overcome their concerns about the message it
would send regarding the immorality of sexual promiscuity and actions taken to
avoid pregnancy. See Collection of Margaret Sanger Papers, supra note 174. This
is exemplified in notes from one of her staffers' exchanges:
I asked [the Senator] pointedly if he was opposed to a physician
prescribing effective harmless contraceptive methods in a case where the
indication was that a pregnancy would result in death. He replied:
'Certainly not. I am not inhuman but I have not considered birth control
from that standpoint. I have considered it only from the conditions that
are existing throughout the country today where every boy and girl or
anybody can buy what they want and there seems to be no restriction.'
Id. Then in the second interview: "[The Senator] is most discouraging-there is no
doubt of his opposition-he feels birth control is murder and that life is taken." Id.
20051
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A few scholars have argued that this same bias motivates
today's insurance exclusions of prescription contraception. 180
Comparing insurers' treatment of different forms of contraception
and their coverage of treatment for male impotence provides some
support of this. For example, sterilization, available to both men
and women, is usually covered, while prescription contraception
used by only women is excluded.' 8' This is significant because the
excluded forms tend to be the reversible forms of contraception
that give women greater opportunity for a low risk and easy way
to prevent pregnancy. 8 2 Sterilization for women is technically
irreversible and entails greater risk and sacrifice. 8 3 This can act
as a significant barrier to accessing birth control for women who
do not want to give up the ability to have children permanently.
Indeed, this may be the intention.
A more prominent example has arisen within the last few
years with the introduction of Viagra. Many insurance companies
and employers rushed to cover Viagra, while continuing to exclude
prescription contraception. 184 Even where the focus is on
prescription contraception as a means to facilitate women's sexual
freedom, a number of people have pointed out the double standard
created by insurers who cover the expensive drug Viagra and
penile implants enabling male sexual activity, while excluding the
less expensive birth control pill and other forms of prescription
contraception that do the same for women.185
Health advocates cite many of the justifications above given
by employers as further evidence of this bias, including the
characterization that such treatment is really a luxury or lifestyle
choice.' 8 6 At least one scholar has argued that "companies who
describe contraception as a 'lifestyle drug' tread dangerously close
180. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
181. See Law, supra note 89, at 372.
182. Id.
183. But see Law, supra note 89, at 372 (suggesting that the preference for
covering irreversible sterilization over reversible forms of contraception may be due
to the fact that insurance has traditionally favored surgical services over other
medical services).
184. See Debra Baker, Viagra Spawns Birth Control Issue, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998,
at 36; Hayden, supra note 166, at 172. However, more plans are refusing to cover
Viagra citing its high cost and potential for abuse. See Hazel Glenn Beh, Sex,
Sexual Pleasure, and Reproduction: Health Insurers Don't Want You to Do Those
Nasty Things, 13 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 119 (1998).
185. See Hayden, supra note 166, at 172; Kathryn Kindell, Prescription for
Fairness: Health Insurance Reimbursement for Viagra and Contraceptives, 35
TULSA L.J. 399, 399-400 (2000).
186. See infra note 187.
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to stereotyping women who elect to control their fertility as
'promiscuous' or 'scandalous."' 187 Finally, anecdotal evidence
reveals that state legislators and much of the public continue to
oppose bills that would mandate prescription contraception
coverage precisely because of concerns that birth control will
encourage women's promiscuity. 8
8
b. Controlling Fertility: 'Women Shouldn't Play God"
While infertility is not unique to women, it is nonetheless
believed to be a woman's problem. Even where people are aware
that the problem can be traced to male infertility, focus remains on
the woman. This is not surprising given that regardless of
whether the man or woman is infertile, significant treatment must
usually be performed on women and that the ultimate goal is for
the woman to achieve a successful pregnancy. 8 9 Because of this
assumed link between gender and infertility, decisions about
fertility treatment are often related to or motivated by gender-
based assumptions.
This is illustrated by a closer look at two common
justifications for excluding insurance coverage of infertility
treatment-that treatment is "unnatural" and merely a "luxury"
or "lifestyle choice," and not medically necessary. 9 0 In some cases,
this bias may be subtle, if not completely hidden. For example, the
characterization of infertility treatment as not medically necessary
may simply be due to ignorance of the medical causes and forms of
infertility.19' However, when such justifications are probed, they
often reveal deeper assumptions about women's responsibility for
causing the infertility, rooted in an ideology about women's
reproductive role in society.
For example, most people are aware that age can be a
significant factor in female infertility, but there seems to be an
187. Hayden, supra note 166, at 184.
188. See Beh, supra note , at 128 (discussing moral hazards of overuse of
reproductive technologies).
189. See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 97, at 7.
190. See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1272 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
191. See also SHER ET AL., supra note 113, at 186 ("When most insurance
companies reimburse for procedures such as penile implants done in cases of male
impotence and yet refuse to cover infertility, it makes one wonder how many
directors and CEOs of these companies are older men who view male impotence as
a life-endangering condition and the desire of a woman to have a baby as a vanity."
(quoting himself from the Oprah show)).
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overemphasis on age as the key factor triggering infertility. 192 The
gender bias becomes apparent because of the further speculation
and characterization of blame about what the afflicted woman did
to bring about the infertility. One of the most common
assumptions is that a woman has waited "too long" to try to have
children, usually because she decided to delay pregnancy until her
career was established. 193 The assumption that a woman
prioritized her career over pregnancy coupled with the
characterization that she waited "too long" reflect the judgment
that a woman is morally blameworthy for intentionally delaying
her pregnancy and that she is the real cause of her own
infertility. 194 It is this assumption or element of blame that
implicitly characterizes infertility as the result of a "lifestyle" or
even "unnatural" choice by women for which they are now being
punished-that is, the unnatural or lifestyle label really describes
a belief about the choices made by a woman that led to her
infertility; not the infertility treatment itself.
If a woman has used birth control to prevent pregnancy, this
has been used as evidence that a woman who tries to control her
fertility in order to have sex without the fear of pregnancy
transgresses some moral tenet. This transgression is seen as
adding to her blameworthiness for the infertility-as if infertility
is punishment for her hubris attempt to control her fertility and
exercise her sexual freedom. 195 Unfortunately, many women
internalize this feeling, which further exacerbates the emotional
effects they suffer. The most compelling and tragic evidence of
this comes from the women themselves-not in court cases
litigating this issue-but through personal narratives, journals,
and other literature that describes the psychological trauma
infertile women experience. 196
192. See Beh, supra note 184, at 123.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Tragic events like the Dalkon Shield example further exacerbate and
illustrate this phenomenon. See Morton Mintz, At Any Cost: Corporate Greed,
Women, and the Dalkon Shield, in CORPORATE VIOLENCE: INJURY AND DEATH FOR
PROFIT (Stuart L. Hills ed., 1987) (describing infertility as one of the horrible side
effects of the IUD produced by the A.H. Robins company). See also Beh, supra note
187, at 123 ("Women especially had to be careful not to enjoy sex because they were
maternal, rather than sexual creatures.").
196. See generally RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 97; SUSAN LEWIS COOPER
& ELLEN SARASOHN GLAZER, CHOOSING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: SOCIAL,
EMOTIONAL & ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS (1998).
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2. Employment Discrimination
Insurance exclusions may violate Title VII whether or not an
employer intends to discriminate against women because
employers can not just adopt an insurer's policy if its exclusions
are discriminatory. 197 Some employers purchasing an insurance
policy for its employees blindly accept the insurance company's
basic policy without much thought and elect not to buy anything
that would add to the cost. However, this is not necessarily the
case. First, employers are not merely passive recipients of
package designs, but often can and do tailor packages based on
cost and employee demands. 198 Second, these exclusions implicate
the kind of bias underlying traditional pregnancy-based
discrimination, and acceptance of such exclusions reflects this bias,
either consciously or subconsciously. In fact, there is evidence that
such bias is conscious and alive in most workplaces today.
As described in Part II, the long history of gender
discrimination in employment is well-documented and its focal
point has been pregnancy. 199 Employers have been quite hostile to
women employees as evidenced by overt exclusions, denial of
197. See supra notes 174-196 and accompanying text.
198. See Eduardo Porter, Cost of Benefits Cited as Factor in Slump in Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at Al (discussing rising costs of health insurance as factor for
employers to drop benefits); see also Sue Fox, Public, Private Employees Feeling
Pinch of Rising Health-Care Costs, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003. Employers
essentially have a dual role as employer and financer of health care. Typically,
employers finance health care for their employees in one of two ways. The
employer can act as a purchaser of health care on behalf of its employees or it can
"self-insure" by establishing its own health insurance plan for its employees. See
Diana Slivinska, Health Care Cost-Containment and Small Businesses: The Self-
Insurance Option, 12 J.L. & Com. 333, 333-34 (1993). In the first case, the
employer pays a fixed monthly premium to an insurance company in exchange for
the insurance company agreeing to pay for certain medical services designated in
the insurance policy. See id. at 334. Usually, the employee must bear a portion of
the cost in the form of a pay deduction. See id. at 336. In self-insurance plans, the
employer usually contracts with a company to manage the administrative aspects
of the insurance, but the employer is really acting as the insurer since it bears the
risk of loss for any amount paid out for health care. See id. In self-insured plans,
any increase any benefits covered increases the employer's potential risk of having
to pay out more money than projected, while in purchased insurance plans, the
added benefit can increase the premiums paid by the employer or employee. See id.
Employers have also tried to avoid liability under Title VII claiming that it is the
insurance company, not the employer, who determines what benefits are excluded.
The Supreme Court has rejected this argument in other benefits cases. See Norris,
463 U.S. at 1083 ("An employer that offers one fringe benefit on a discriminatory
basis cannot escape liability because he also offers other benefits on a
nondiscriminatory basis.'). This reasoning applies even more so in the health
benefits context because employers play a role in designing the health plan and
often have the option of adding benefits for an additional price.
199. See supra notes 84-160 and accompanying text.
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promotions, and pay differentials to name just a few examples. 200
Employers have historically offered several justifications for such
discrimination, including beliefs that pregnancy makes women
unsuitable for certain kinds of work, that the cost of pregnancy
creates intolerable burdens to employers and male employees, and
that women, who will ultimately get pregnant and leave anyway
(to stay home and be supported by a husband) are stealing job
opportunities from deserving men.20 '
There is evidence that these same fears lead employers to
discourage women from undergoing infertility treatment. 202
Several cases have been brought under Title VII and the PDA to
challenge adverse actions, such as termination, allegedly
motivated by assumptions about the effects of a woman's
pregnancy or infertility treatment on her job performance. 2 3 To
the extent that women, because of their capacity to become
pregnant, will need time off to undergo more diagnostic or other
treatment procedures, not to mention the resulting pregnancy that
will hopefully be achieved, employers may view this as a conflict
with the employee's ability to be a productive employee. 20 4 In fact,
200. See ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST
IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 87-98 (2001).
201. SUE HEADLEE & MARGERY ELFIN, THE COST OF BEING FEMALE 5-20 (1996).
Research reveals that working mothers in the United States earn less than men
and childless women, per hour, even after controlling for education and experience.
See CRITTENDEN, supra note 200, at 94.
202. See infra note 203.
203. See, e.g., Laporta v. Wal-Mart Stores, 163 F. Supp. 2d 758 (W.D. Mich. 2001)
(ruling on plaintiff who alleged that she was terminated as a result of her need to
seek infertility treatment); Lehman v. Adecco N. Am., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6391
(N.D. Ill. 2001) (ruling on plaintiff who alleged that she was terminated because
she communicated her intent to undergo infertility treatment to become pregnant);
Koerts v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 1997 W.L. 30987 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (ruling
on plaintiff who alleged that she had been discharged as a result of her undergoing
in vitro fertilization treatments); Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340 (8th
Cir. 1997) (ruling on plaintiff who alleged that she was demoted because she had
become pregnant); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(ruling on plaintiff who alleged that she was terminated as a result of her
undergoing infertility treatment); Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (ruling on plaintiff who alleged that she was terminated as a result
of undergoing infertility treatment); Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d
1211 (6th Cir. 1995) (ruling on plaintiff who alleged that she had been discharged
because of her intent to have an abortion); Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d
734 (7th Cir. 1994) (ruling on plaintiff who alleged that she was discharged because
of time off needed due to her pregnancy).
204. RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 97, at 224-25.
Women are particularly affected [by infertility], since they are the ones
who undergo ovulatory stimulation and have to deal with medical
appointments that can mean hours and even days away from work.
Although the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) requires many
employers to allow both men and women to take unpaid leave for
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evidence shows that many employers expressly do not want to
cover infertility treatment because of the concern that too many
women would take advantage of it.205 Anecdotal evidence also
reveals a pervasive practice among women who hide the fact that
they are receiving infertility treatment and their plans to have a
child in general for fear of discrimination by their employers. 20 6 In
this respect, an employer's reason for denying infertility benefits
may merely be an extension of the same biases that have formed
the basis for a pervasive history of pregnancy-based employment
discrimination-the type of bias the PDA was expressly enacted to
prevent.
B. Common Employer Justifications
As noted above, employment-based insurance plans and
policy justifications vary from case-to-case, so it is nearly
impossible to anticipate whether an employer will be able to
successfully rebut a plaintiffs claim. 207 However, several
justifications have been consistently offered for such exclusions,
and these justifications illustrate employers' difficulty in rebutting
the prima facie case either because of inconsistencies with other
coverage decisions or a lack of sound actuarial or medical grounds
for the exclusion.
As already noted, a recurring reason for excluding both
prescription contraception and infertility treatment is the
perception that they are merely a luxury or lifestyle choice, and
not medically necessary health care. 208 In fact, infertility
treatment is often likened to "elective" procedures such as
cosmetic surgery. 209 These justifications are easily challenged
since they are not consistent with sound medical judgment about
pregnancy and related matters without worry about losing their jobs,
doing so is often not practical or is cost-prohibitive in terms of lost wages
and benefits. As well, smaller employers-which account for nearly half of
the nation's employment-are not bound by the FMLA. And although the
FMLA may assure you can return to your job, taking extended periods of
time off work can derail your career track.
Id.
205. See infra notes 252-270 and accompanying text (discussing Krauel v. Iowa
Methodist Medical Center).
206. See, e.g., RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 97, at 225.
207. See supra note 197-206 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., supra note 191 and accompanying text
209. See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 97, at 296; see Brock, supra note
208, at 224-25. Dan W. Brock, Funding New Reproductive Technologies: Should
They Be Included in Health Insurance Benefit Packages, in NEW WAYS OF MAKING
BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG DONATION 213, 224-25 (Cynthia B. Cohen ed., 1996).
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the causes and treatment necessary to correct infertility. While
the decision about whether to have a family is a deeply personal
one that inevitably involves some "lifestyle" choices, a women's
ability to prevent and control the timing of her pregnancies is an
important health issue.2 10
Employers are most vulnerable to Title VII claims when their
justifications for female reproductive health exclusions are
patently inconsistent with their own policy decisions for other
treatment. For example, employers have justified prescription
contraception exclusions on the grounds that it is "preventive" and
not necessary to treat or correct an existing illness. 211 This
argument is not credible for many plans that do cover other
preventive medications. 212
For IVF and other assisted reproductive treatment,
employers and insurers have argued that the treatment should not
be considered medically necessary because it does not cure or
correct the actual cause of the infertility. 213 This is also
210. This justification does not account for the fact that pregnancy is not always
desired and can be medically risky if it would exacerbate an already serious illness.
See ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., CONTRACEPTIVE USE: FACTS IN BRIEF (stating that
"[miore than 3 million unintended pregnancies occur each year in the United
States"); see also Brietta R. Clark, When Free Exercise Exemptions Undermine
Religious Liberty & the Liberty of Conscience: A Case Study of the Catholic Hospital
Conflict, 82 OR. L. REV. 625, 641-48 (2003); Melissa Cole, Beyond Sex
Discrimination: Why Employers Discriminate Against Women with Disabilities
When Their Employee Health Plans Exclude Contraceptives from Prescription
Coverage, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 508-21 (2001).
211. See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1272 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
212. One other common reason that may be offered is that offering
contraceptions would violate religious beliefs. See, e.g., Milt Freudenheim, Federal
Health Plans to Include One Shaped by Catholic Tenets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2004,
at Al, Lexis/Nexis. There is a special exemption in Title VII for religious
organizations "with respect. to the employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational, institution, or society of its activities." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
1(a) (2000). However, this exemption has been interpreted narrowly and it is
questionable whether it could be used in the benefits context at all. See Law, supra
note 89, at 384-86. At least one employer has tried unsuccessfully to challenge a
mandate to provide prescription contraception under the federal Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004); see also Clark, supra note 210, at 649-65
(arguing that the federal Free Exercise Clause probably does not provide any
protection against laws designed to remedy discrimination in health care by
increasing access to reproductive health services for women).
213. See Brock, supra note 209, at 225-26. Another reason given for the
exclusion of IVF and certain surgical implantation procedures is that the treatment
is "experimental" or "not standard practice." The fact that a treatment is
"experimental" can be the basis of a legitimate exclusion in health plans. This is
easily subject to challenge for infertility, however, if it is merely assumed, and not
2005] ERICKSON V BARTELL DRUG CO.
disingenuous in light of the fact that employers usually cover other
medical care that does not actually cure the underlying medical
problem, but serves only to ameliorate its harmful effects, such as
penile implants, dialysis treatment for diabetics, and drug
medication for high blood pressure. 214
For the exclusion of both prescription contraception and
infertility treatments, employers have asserted cost as either a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason or as a defense of business
necessity to overcome the plaintiffs' claim of discrimination. 215
Cost is such an important factor because a critical aspect to our
employment-based system of financing health care is that it is
voluntary. Consequently, any debate about expanding
employment-based health benefits centers around the fear that if
costs get too high, employees' premiums will become prohibitively
expensive or employers will stop providing health insurance
altogether.2 16
based on scientific evidence. For example, much is made of the fact that outcomes
are not guaranteed or predictable; however, this is not unique to fertility treatment.
See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 97, at 302.
214. See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 97, at 302. Cancer treatment
provides a perfect example of the inconsistent treatment of reproductive health.
Much of the treatment that cancer patients get is designed to treat or ameliorate
many of the complications that result from cancer, such as medication prescribed to
alleviate the pain or nausea from cancer treatment. Moreover, even though we
know that infertility is one of the many effects of cancer treatment, infertility
caused by such treatment remains excluded.
215. See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir.
1996) (stating that cost was a motivating factor in employer's decision to exclude
coverage for infertility treatment); Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1274 (stating
employer's argument that it should be permitted to exclude prescription
contraception from its employee benefit programs in order to control costs); EEOC
Decision Coverage of Contraception, nn.17-19 and accompanying text (arguing that
contraception was excluded for "strictly financial reasons"), available at
http://eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2005);
see also SHER ET AL., supra note 147, at 185-87.
216. The critical role of employment-based health benefits in the U.S. health
care delivery system has been especially prominent in the news the last few years.
See, e.g., John M. Broder et al., Problem of Lost Health Benefits is Reaching into the
Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2002, at Al; Daniel Costello, Firms Cut Back
Medical Coverage: Faced with Soaring Costs, Many Employers Are Discouraging
Workers from Adding Spouses or Children to Their Insurance Plans, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 2003, at Fl; Sue Fox, Public, Private Employees Feeling Pinch of Rising
Health-Care Costs, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at B1; Eduardo Porter, Cost of
Benefits Cited as Factor in Slump in Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at Al; Union
for Grocery Store Clerks Explains How Contract Might Affect Health Care, CAL.
HEALTHLINE, Oct. 23, 2003, available at http://www.californiahealthline.org/
index.cfm?Action=dspltem&itemID95803&classcd=CL350 (last visited Mar. 5,
2005).
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1. The Availability of the Cost Defense
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is no cost
defense under Title VII. 217 In Newport News, for example, the
Court noted that "no [cost] justification is recognized under Title
VII once discrimination has been shown." 218 Moreover, in two
other benefits cases, the Court rejected cost as a rebuttal to the
plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination.219 These cases were
decided on disparate treatment grounds, however, and there is
other authority suggesting that the need to control cost may
qualify as a business necessity in disparate impact claims.
For example, in Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co.,220 a Title VII
challenge was brought against an employer's medical insurance
"head-of-household rule." This rule allowed an employee to obtain
coverage for a spouse only if the employee earned more than half
of the couple's combined income. 22' The plaintiffs successfully
alleged a prima facie case of disparate impact.2 22 The plaintiffs
lost, however, because the Ninth Circuit found that the rule was
instituted for a legitimate, business reason:
[It was] designed to benefit the largest number of employees
and those with the greatest need. [The employer] concluded
that dependent children and spouses covered under the head-
of-household rule have the greatest need for dependent
coverage. Qualifying spouses are less likely to have other
medical insurance. It seeks to keep the cost of the plan to its
217. See Newport News Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 683 n.26 (1983); Norris,
463 U.S. at 1074-75 (per curiam); L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 716-17 (1978).
218. 462 U.S. at 683 n.26. But see Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S.
187, 211 (1991) (reserving the possibility that a policy or action may be so
prohibitively expensive as to qualify as a BFOQ defense to disparate treatment).
219. See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 716-17. In Manhart, the city required women to
pay more into the company retirement fund than men. Id. The city argued that
there was no discriminatory effect on women as a class because there was a like
difference in the cost of benefits being provided for women versus men. Id. The
Court rejected this argument on the grounds that "neither Congress nor the courts
have recognized such a defense under Title VII." Id. at 717; see also Norris, 463
U.S. at 1086 (rejecting a similar cost argument by employer attempting to justify a
retirement plan that paid women lower monthly benefits than a man who had
made the same contributions); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) ("It shall not be a defense
under Title VII to a charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such
benefits is greater with respect to one sex than the other.").
220. 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1983).
221. See id. at 1493.
222. See id. at 1494-95. Despite the fact that 70 percent of Penney's employees
were female, only 37 percent of the women and 95 percent of the men covered by
the medical plan received dependent coverage. Moreover, "[olnly 12.5 percent of
the married female employees qualified as heads of household, while 89.34 percent
of the married males qualified." Id. at 1493-94.
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employees as low as possible, so that the needy can afford
coverage. If all spouses are included, the contribution rates
will increase. 223
Under this approach, cost considerations would be relevant in
disparate impact claims, especially in light of the perceived
precariousness of employment-based coverage if costs are not
contained. 224 The problem with this approach, however, is that
cost is at the heart of any benefits decision. This would seem to
create a justification that could completely eradicate any
meaningful disparate impact claims in the benefits context.
Moreover, this is inconsistent with the broader principle
established in the benefits cases about the role of cost. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that while cost can be a
legitimate factor in an employer's decision, employers can not
treat women and men differently in coverage decisions because of
cost differentials in the type of treatment for each class. 225 In
other words, cost should not be used to justify or mask gender
discrimination.
2. Determining Whether Cost is a Pretext for
Discrimination
Assuming that a cost defense is available in disparate impact
claims, courts can not nonetheless merely defer to the employer's
claim that cost is the motivating reason for the exclusion.22 6 Given
the difficulty of proving actual motive, health advocates can
challenge the legitimacy of a cost justification by demonstrating
that the alleged cost increase is not significant enough to justify
the exclusion. This has been easy to do in the case of prescription
contraceptives because the cost of prescription contraception for an
employer is minimal in light of the employer's resources and
ability to spread its costs among employees. 22 7 In fact, evidence
223. Id. at 1495.
224. See supra notes 137-160 and accompanying text.
225. See Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp.
Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1085 (1983); L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 (1978).
226. See, e.g., Wambheim, 705 F.2d at 1495 (noting that a cost defense could not
overcome a showing by the plaintiff that the rule is a pretext for impermissible
discrimination).
227. See ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., The Cost of Contraceptive Insurance Coverage
(2003) (adapted from an article by Cynthia Dailard, in The Guttmacher Report on
Public Policy, March 2003), at http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/ib_4-03.html (last
visited Mar. 5, 2005)(estimating that average added cost to employers of covering




suggests that employers save money by covering prescription
contraception because it prevents pregnancy and the tremendous
costs that can accompany unwanted or medically risky
pregnancies. 228
In the infertility context, this has been harder to do. Beliefs
about the exorbitant cost of infertility treatments are pervasive,
due in part to society's preoccupation with the cost of IVF.229 In
contrast to the case of prescription contraception, it seems
intuitively clear that infertility coverage will actually increase
overall costs since, if successful, it will lead to pregnancy which
requires additional treatment and monitoring of the woman's and
child's health. Furthermore, certain fertility treatments are
associated with an increased risk of multiple births, which can
cause harmful effects to women and their fetuses, which in turn
lead to greater societal cost. 23 0
The significance of these economic or health effects of
covering infertility is not clear cut. For example, one study has
estimated that the additional cost of covering IVF would likely
only be a small fraction of the total cost of a family plan. 231
Moreover, as noted in Part II, health risks and social costs due to
multiple births are not necessarily avoided by, and may in fact be
aggravated by, denying coverage of fertility treatment.232
Without actuarial support for the high costs of covering the
various types of infertility treatment, courts should not
automatically defer to employers' characterization of such
justifications as significant enough to qualify as a business
necessity or a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
exclusion. While rising health care costs are a significant concern
and employers must have decision-making discretion to control
business costs and allocate resources in ways that advance
legitimate medical and health care policy, this is not what I see
being done currently. Rather, the evidence points to employers
228. See id.
229. Cf. SHER ET AL., supra note 113, at 129 (warning couples about the financial
commitment of IVF); see also Brock, supra note 209, at 228 (noting that the cost of
assisted reproductive technology for a single pregnancy can reach into the
thousands or even tens of thousands of dollars, but that many other treatments
designed to improve quality of life can have comparable cost).
230. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in
Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 10 (2004).
231. See Brock, supra note 209, at 228 (noting that the estimated cost of
mandated coverage of infertility treatment in Massachusetts is about 4/10 of 1
percent of a family premium).
232. See supra notes 137-160 and accompanying text.
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acting inconsistently with their other policy choices and accepted
scientific knowledge about the health implications of denying
reproductive health treatment. Unless purported justifications are
scrutinized and the challenged exclusions are compared with
treatment of male reproductive health benefits, employers will be
able to use these apparently neutral classifications to advance
certain values about women's reproductive roles in ways that
create disparate financial, emotional, and physical health risks to
women.
IV. The Dominant Approach: Title VII Challenges to
Reproductive Health Exclusions
Parts II and III of this Article demonstrate that, at a
minimum, prescription contraception and infertility exclusions
make out the prima facie case for gender discrimination, and
employers' justifications for such classifications should be closely
scrutinized. 233 However, in this Part, I will show that most courts
resist seeing these challenges as issues of gender discrimination
under Title VII and the PDA, under what I term the "dominant
approach." While Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co. was widely viewed
as an example that Title VII can be a powerful tool for ensuring
gender equality in employment-based health care, Erickson
appears to be the lone exception to this dominant approach.
Challenges to reproductive health benefit exclusions
implicate the same issue that troubled the Supreme Court in
Gilbert: whether there is sufficient identity between the excluded
benefit and gender for the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case.
This issue is actually framed as a definitional one-that is,
whether the excluded condition or treatment is "pregnancy-
related" for purposes of making out a prima facie case under the
PDA. The way courts have chosen to answer this question forms
the basis for the two different visions of Title VII and the PDA
that I identify.
In this Part, I will review the cases that follow the dominant
approach to sketch out the framework being used in challenges to
benefits exclusions. 234 Under the dominant approach, courts
distinguish Title VII from the PDA, viewing the original language
under Title VII as much more straightforward and easier to apply.
If they can decide the case based on this original language-the
"on the basis of sex" requirement-they do so. Thus, courts focus
233. See supra notes 84-232 and accompanying text.
234. See infra notes 235-294 and accompanying text.
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on the form of treatment or condition excluded to try to find a clear
gender link. Where the form of treatment is only used by women
(that is, in the cases challenging exclusions of the prescription
contraception used only by women), courts find that a facial
disparate treatment claim is easily made out. There is no need to
consider a disparate impact claim.
In cases where a perfect gender link cannot be found (that is,
in the cases challenging infertility benefits or exclusions of both
male and female contraceptive treatment), gender neutrality is
assumed and no prima facie case for disparate treatment is made
out under the original Title VII language. While plaintiffs try to
make a disparate impact claim, drawing upon the PDA to help
illustrate the gender-specific effects that occur due to women's
unique ability to become pregnant, this clearly makes courts
uncomfortable. Courts dismiss the claim often on ambiguous or
unsatisfying grounds. Moreover, despite the courts' purported
consideration of disparate impact or PDA-based claims, they seem
to view the PDA as completely irrelevant where the form of the
exclusion is apparently gender neutral. In other words, just like
the Gilbert majority, courts today continue to refuse to look closely
at pregnancy-related classifications that do not have a perfect
gender link and treat disparate treatment and disparate impact
claims as one in the same.
A. Prescription Contraception Cases
To date, there is only one other case 235 besides Erickson
analyzing a prescription contraception exclusion in depth. In
EEOC v. UPS, 236 the plaintiff presented a claim for
reimbursement for prescription contraception to treat a female
hormonal disorder that was denied by the plaintiffs employer. 237
The EEOC filed a complaint against the employer claiming that
the denial violated Title VII.238 The crux of the complaint was that
the defendant violated the plain language of Title VII, by treating
women and men differently by the express terms of the policy. 239
The employer's plan covered drugs for male hormonal disorders,
235. A challenge to prescription contraception exclusions was also brought in
Mauldin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 89 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1600 (N.D. Ga.
2002) (granting class certification for Title VII lawsuit challenging the exclusion on
disparate treatment and disparate impact grounds).
236. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Minn. 2001).
237. Id. at 1217.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1219.
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but failed to cover the pill, an important treatment used for female
hormonal disorders. 240 The court agreed that this differential
treatment of men and women's coverage for comparable hormonal
disorders constituted a facial disparate treatment and disparate
impact claim under Title VII.241
While the EEOC based its original claim on the basic Title
VII prohibition, it had requested permission to supplement the
record to include a PDA-based claim that the exclusions of
prescription contraception were "pregnancy-related" and thus
violated the PDA's prohibition on discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy-related conditions. 242 Although the court did not have
to address the PDA-based claim, it nonetheless noted that it had
"serious doubts about the merits of a PDA claim in this
context .... "243
Another court has expressly rejected the argument that the
PDA protects prescription contraception. 244 In Alexander v.
American Airlines, 245 the plaintiff challenged an employer's
exclusions of pap smears, contraceptive medications and devices,
and infertility medications and treatments.246 The court granted
the employer's motion to dismiss on the contraceptive claims
because the plaintiff lacked standing.247 In an unreported decision,
the court noted that even if there was standing, it would reject the
claim because contraception is not protected under the PDA.248 It
made the broad claim that there cannot be gender discrimination
if contraception used by men and women is excluded. 249 The court
failed to even acknowledge the possibility of a disparate impact
claim.250
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1219-20. Another argument that surfaced was based on a "couple
assumption." See id. The employer tried to argue that male and female employees
were equally burdened by the exclusion, since oral contraceptives were not
available to the spouses of male employees. Id. The court rejected this argument
and noted that since oral contraceptives were only prescribed to women, only
women were burdened and thus the exclusion constituted a prima facie case for
disparate impact. Id.
242. Id. at 12 18 n.1.
243. Id.
244. Alexander v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 4:02CV0052, 2002 WL 731815, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2002) (not reported in federal supplement).
245. Id.
246. Id. at *1.
247. Id. at *2.





In both cases, the courts looked for an obvious link between
gender and the exclusion. Where the form of the exclusion was
only available to women, a disparate treatment claim was easy.
Neither the relationship of the exclusion to pregnancy nor the
PDA was considered relevant. Moreover, the employer was not
required to justify the exclusion.
B. Infertility Treatment Cases
Courts are even more hostile to challenges to infertility
treatment under the dominant approach. They are either
dismissing such claims or granting summary judgment to the
employer. The cases below cite as an overriding factor the gender-
neutral elements of infertility-that infertility afflicts men and
women, that the excluded treatments are those used by men and
women, and that such treatments are often used to treat some
combination of male and female infertility. 251 Courts depend
almost exclusively on these facts in rejecting any claims of
disparate treatment or disparate impact under the original
language of Title VII. Gender neutrality is also used by courts to
reject plaintiffs' PDA-based claims, namely as justification for why
courts define "pregnancy-related" narrowly to exclude infertility
from protection.
This approach is exemplified in Krauel v. Iowa Methodist
Medical Center.252 The plaintiff, Ms. Krauel, was an employee of
Iowa Methodist Medical Center (IMMC) and was diagnosed with
endometriosis which led to infertility. 253 Krauel underwent a
laparoscopy (laser surgery) to eliminate the condition, but was still
unable to become pregnant after one year.254 She then underwent
fertility treatments, including artificial insemination, and after
three treatments became pregnant. 255 IMMC covered the
laparascopy, pregnancy, and delivering expenses, but it denied
coverage for Krauel's fertility treatment based on an express
exclusion in the plan. 256
Krauel brought suit against IMMC alleging that the
251. See infra notes 253-293 and accompanying text.
252. 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
253. Id. at 675. "Endometriosis is a condition in which the lining of the uterus
grows aberrantly.., outside the uterus including in the fallopian tubes and
ovaries." Id. at 675 n.2.
254. Id. at 675-76.
255. Id. at 676.
256. Id. This is an example of the fact that blanket exclusions of infertility do
not foreclose all treatment.
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exclusion for fertility treatments violated Title VII and the PDA.257
She argued that the infertility exclusion was an impermissible
sex-based classification under the original language of Title VII
and that it violated the PDA since it was treatment of a medical
condition "related to pregnancy or childbirth." 258 The Eighth
Circuit treated these as independent claims and first rejected the
plaintiffs PDA claim, holding that infertility did not qualify as a
"pregnancy-related condition' for purposes of protection under the
PDA.259 It distinguished pregnancy and childbirth, which occur
after conception, from infertility, which prevents conception,
finding them "strikingly different."260 It failed to note, however,
why this difference was so "striking" or why a difference in timing
should result in different legal protection under the PDA.261
The plaintiff also presented evidence that the policy was the
result of intentional discrimination by the employer. 262 The
plaintiff alleged that the Vice President of IMMC said that
coverage for infertility treatment was excluded "because too many
women of child-bearing age were employed by IMMC and
infertility treatments result in too many multiple births, thereby
creating a financial burden on the Plan."263 The court dismissed
this claim using circular reasoning, holding "as a matter of law
that the alleged statements do not rise to the level of sex
discrimination," since they only indicate that cost may have been a
motivating factor in IMMC's decision.264 It then noted that cost
considerations do not violate Title VII because there was no sex-
based classification under the PDA. 265 The court failed to
acknowledge evidence that the exclusion was motivated by the
employer's belief that infertility benefits are used primarily, if not
solely, by women, and its concerns that the effects of such
treatment would result in pregnancy.266
In an equally cursory analysis, the court rejected the
plaintiff's disparate impact claim. 267 The plaintiff alleged that
257. Id.
258. Id. at 679-80.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 679.
261. Id. It also cited the lack of EEOC guidelines about infertility treatments as
evidence that infertility was not covered by the PDA. Id. at 679.
262. See id. at 680.




267. Id. at 681.
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infertility treatments have a greater impact on women because
women are required more often than not to undergo treatment and
extensive diagnostic testing and monitoring, even where the man
is the infertile one.268 The plaintiff also alleged that women suffer
a greater impact because they bear the larger portion of the costs
for such treatments. 269 These arguments were rejected on the
grounds that the plaintiff offered insufficient statistical evidence
for support. 270
At least two other courts have cited to Krauel in support of
granting an employer's motion to dismiss in similar complaints. 27 1
In Alexander v. American Airlines, 272 the plaintiff brought a Title
VII and PDA-based challenge against the employer's infertility
exclusion, in addition to the prescription contraception exclusion
discussed above. 273 In justifying its dismissal of the infertility
claims, the court simply cited Krauel for the proposition that, as a
matter of law, infertility or the inability to become pregnant is not
"pregnancy related" within the meaning of the PDA.274
In the other case, Niemeier v. Tri-State Fire Protection,275 the
Illinois Federal District Court rejected a Title VII challenge to an
exclusion of infertility benefits by a former employee and his
wife. 276 The claims based on the original Title VII language were
dismissed on procedural grounds, so only the PDA claim was
addressed.277 The court cited Krauel in rejecting the plaintiffs
PDA-based claim. 278 It held that the PDA only requires employers
to treat pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions in a
"neutral way."279 Once again, the disparate health and financial
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of IMMC. Id.
271. See Alexander v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 4:02CV0052, 2002 WL 731815, at
*3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2002) (not reported in federal supplement); Niemeier v. Tri-
State Fire Protection, No. 99 C 7391, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12621 (N.D. Il. Aug.
24, 2000).
272. 2002 WL 731815.
273. Id. at *1.
274. See id. at *2.
275. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12621.
276. Id. at *2. In this case, Mr. Niemeier and his wife were covered under a
health/medical benefits plan that had an express exclusion for coverage of artificial
insemination and "treatment for other sexual dysfunctions not related to organic
disease." Id. at *3.
277. Id. at *12, *14-*20.
278. See id. at *19.
279. Id. at *18-*20. The plaintiffs tried to assert that the plan only excluded
infertility testing and treatment for females in support of their Title VII claim;
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effects were not even considered.
Finally, in Saks v. Covey,280 the plaintiff brought a challenge
against a policy that covered some infertility treatments, but had
an express exclusion for IVF and surgical implantation
procedures. 281 The plaintiff, Rochelle Saks, believed that she had
a compelling claim of disparate treatment and impact based on the
fact that the employer expressly excluded only surgical
implantation procedures that were performed on women.28 2 Saks
claimed discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII's
original language because the policy provided comprehensive
coverage for surgical procedures to treat male infertility, but
incomplete coverage for surgical treatments to treat female
infertility.28 3 She also argued that the exclusion violated the PDA
because the plan's benefits for infertility treatments were inferior
to its coverage for non-pregnancy-related illnesses. 28 4 The district
court granted summary judgment to the employer on both
claims, 285 which was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. 286
The Second Circuit narrowly defined "the proper inquiry in
reviewing a sex discrimination challenge to a health benefits plan
[as] whether sex-specific conditions exist, and if so, whether
exclusion of benefits for those conditions results in a plan that
provides inferior coverage to one sex."28 7 According to the court,
however, the court disregarded this allegation since it was contrary to the Plan's
express exclusion and since the plaintiff did not introduce any evidence to support
the contention. Id. at *20 n.3.
280. 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003).
281. Id. at 340-41.
282. See id. at 346-47. After the plaintiff attempted unsuccessfully to have a
child, she pursued several medical courses of action. Id. at 341. These included
ovulation kits, taking Clomid to induce and regulate ovulation, intrauterine
inseminations (IUIs), in vitro fertilization (IVF), progesterone and estrogen, several
injectable fertility drugs, and blood tests and ultrasounds which monitored the
potential side effects of the drugs. Id. Saks became pregnant three times, but none
made it to term. Id. She was denied reimbursement for the interuterine system
(IUS), IVFs, injectable fertility drugs, and monitoring tests. Id. at 342. The plan
denied reimbursement for the IUI and IVF based on an express exclusion for
surgical impregnation techniques. Id. Under the terms of the plan, injectable
drugs were usually covered; however, Saks was denied reimbursement for these
drugs and the related monitoring because they were used in conjunction with the
excluded impregnation procedures. Id.
283. Id. at 346-47.
284. Id. at 345.
285. Id. at 342.
286. The judgment was affirmed on grounds different from the reasoning of the
district court. See id. at 343.
287. Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
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"for a condition to fall within the,PDA's inclusion of 'pregnancy...
and related medical conditions' as sex-based characteristics, that
condition must be unique to women."28 8 The court then held that
the exclusion did not violate either the PDA or Title VII because
while fertility is obviously related to pregnancy in the medical
sense, it is not a sex-based characteristic unique to women. 289 In
fact, the court noted that because infertility afflicts men and
women with equal frequency, a disparate impact claim could not
even be made.290
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs claim that Title VII
was violated because the policy only excluded infertility
treatments which are performed on women. 291 While it
acknowledged that in certain contexts exclusion of women-only
surgical treatments "might arguably constitute a violation of Title
VII," it rejected this argument here because surgical impregnation
procedures are necessary as a result of male and female
infertility.292 Thus, every court to address this issue to date has
rejected plaintiffs' attempts to even bring such claims. In every
case, courts fail to find a sufficient link between gender and the
excluded treatment, and they do not consider the PDA relevant at
all. 293
In each case discussed above, the courts found that no prima
facie case was made out because of the gender-neutral aspects of
infertility. Consequently, these courts never scrutinized the
employers' justifications for the exclusion to determine if there
was a legitimate medical or policy reason for the exclusion or if it
was merely a pretext for discrimination. 294 Under this dominant
approach, the courts ignore all of the information set forth in Parts
II and III of this Article about the different health effects of
288. Id. at 346.
289. Id. (citing to Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991)).
290. Cf. id. at 346.
291. Id. at 349.
292. Id. at 347.
293. See id. at 346.
294. There has been one case in which the court denied the defendant's motion
to dismiss plaintiffs Title VII challenge to infertility exclusions. See Bielicki v. City
of Chicago, No. 97 C 1471, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6880 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 1997). In a
very brief decision, the court stated that the allegation that the City denied
coverage for plaintiffs infertility treatments, while paying for infertility treatments
for males covered under the same health plan, was enough to raise sufficient
evidence of an inference of discriminatory intent for purposes of defeating a
summary judgment motion. Id. at *10. However, this claim appears to be
challenging disparate treatment in the administration of a policy that ordinarily
covers infertility treatment, not the express policy exclusion itself. Cf. id. at *2-*3,
*9-*10.
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infertility on men and women and the likely stereotyping and
gender bias motivating such exclusions. Under the dominant
approach, plaintiffs appear to have no recourse under Title VII
absent the most obvious cases of intentional discrimination or
disparate treatment.
V. Critique of the Dominant Approach: Why Courts Resist
Title VII Challenges to Benefits Exclusions
Part IV demonstrates that in several ways courts continue to
resist the notion that reproductive health exclusions implicate
Title VII. First, they interpret the PDA narrowly to only protect
exclusions of sex-specific conditions, regardless of any relationship
between the excluded treatment and pregnancy. Second, they
focus exclusively on the gender-neutral aspects of the exclusion in
finding that the plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case.
Finally, they do not apply a meaningful disparate impact analysis
that considers the disparate health and financial effects on women
that result from the exclusion.
A look at the benefits cases within the larger context of civil
rights litigation suggests that this resistance stems in part from a
fear that plaintiffs are using the PDA to try to obtain special
protection or entitlements for pregnancy, which would undermine
the equality principles underlying Title VII and the PDA.
Evidence of this fear is found throughout the prescription
contraception and infertility cases described in Part IV. For
example, in rejecting the plaintiffs' PDA-based claim, Krauel and
Niemeir emphatically noted that the PDA only requires employers
to treat pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions in a
neutral way. In Saks, the court rejected the plaintiffs claims
based on its interpretation of the PDA as only protecting
conditions unique to women.295 While not fully fleshed out in the
cases, this fear seems rooted in two long-standing and related
tensions in civil rights law: the courts' tendency to view
reproductive rights issues as implicating privacy rights, not
gender equality, and a debate between equal and special
treatment theorists in defining the proper legal framework for
ensuring equality under Title VII and the PDA.296
295. Saks v. Covey, 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003).
296. See infra notes 297-313 and accompanying text.
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A. A Privacy Versus Equality Paradigm for Reproductive
Rights
The first problem underlying the dominant approach stems
from courts' tendency to view reproductive rights cases as a
privacy issue as opposed to one of gender equity. Early
movements to protect reproductive health focused on fighting
active government interference in the form of criminal prohibitions
on abortion and the dissemination of birth control. 297 Success was
limited, however, because while courts removed formal, legal
barriers to such treatment, there were still economic barriers for
many women without adequate resources. For example, the
federal government and some states expressly prohibited using
Medicaid funds for abortions, even ones that were medically
necessary, except in very limited circumstances. 298 Some public
facilities refused to provide abortion services at all.299
These limits on access to public resources were challenged as
a violation of privacy rights and equal protection for women, but in
an important series of cases, the Supreme Court made clear that
the Fourteenth Amendment does not obligate the government to
subsidize abortion through funding or access to public facilities. 300
The Court did not consider such claims as implicating gender
equality, rather it seemed to focus on the implication of a privacy
right. As such, the Court characterized plaintiffs' claims as
requests for the subsidization of a fundamental right or special
entitlements inconsistent with protections of the 14th Amendment.
297. See, e.g., supra notes 177-182 and accompanying text (describing the legal
barriers to the dissemination of information about birth control). See also Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the government may not ban abortions
prior to the time at which the fetus can survive on its own outside the womb).
298. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (challenge to the Hyde
Amendment which prohibited Mediciad funding for abortions, except those
necessary to save the life of the mother and in cases of rape).
299. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Svcs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (challenge to
a state law prohibiting state employees from performing abortions and the use of
public facilities for performing abortions).
300. See Harris, 448 U.S. 297 (holding that the prohibition of Medicaid funds for
abortions does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1980) (holding that exclusion of funding for non-therapeutic abortions does not
violate the constitutional right of a woman to decide to terminate her pregnancy);
Williams v. Zbarez, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Webster, 492 U.S. 490 (upholding a state
law prohibiting state employees from performing abortions and the use of public
facilities for performing abortions). The Court in dicta has also suggested that this
applies to other non-abortion reproductive health services. See Williams, 448 U.S.
at 318 ("It cannot be that because government may not prohibit the use of
contraceptives ... government, therefore, has an affirmative constitutional
obligation to ensure that all persons have the financial resources to obtain
contraceptives .... ).
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This framework, established in Geduldig in 1976, allowed
pregnancy-benefits exclusions in public employment benefits plans,
and was ultimately adopted by the Gilbert majority as the
framework for Title VII challenges.3 01 The PDA is so important
because it makes clear that this is not the only framework for
considering claims related to reproductive rights, and that
reproductive health exclusions do implicate gender equity under
Title VII.
B. The Special versus Equal Treatment Debate: The Proper
Role of the PDA in Ensuring Equality Between the Sexes
Title VII's fundamental purpose is to guarantee equality
between the sexes in employment, and the PDA was designed to
further this purpose by making it clear that employers cannot use
women's differences as a basis for discrimination. In fact,
differential treatment related to sex-specific characteristics, such
as pregnancy-related classifications, must be scrutinized closely
because reproduction has been the focal point of a long history of
employment discrimination against women. 302 The "special"
versus "equal treatment" debate represents two contrasting
theories about the relationship between equality and difference
and the proper approach to guaranteeing gender equality.30 3
In short, equal treatment theorists argue that equality is
accomplished by ignoring the differences between men and women
and treating them the same; special treatment theorists argue
that certain differences between men and women must be
acknowledged and accommodated in order to ensure equality.30 4
The difference in the two approaches becomes visible where there
is a gender-neutral policy or structure that may be more
burdensome to women because of their unique ability to become
301. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974).
302. See supra notes 43-83 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 24-30 (1985).
304. Cf. Williams & Segal, supra note 20, at 351-80. See generally Kay, supra
note 303 (arguing against an equal treatment type model in situations of biological
differences between men and women); Sally J. Kenney, Pregnancy Discrimination:
Toward Substantive Equality, 10 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 351 (1995) (discussing the
advances and gaps in the movement toward accommodation of pregnancy); Colette
G. Matzzie, Substantive Equality and Antidiscrimination: Accommodating
Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82 GEO. L.J. 193 (1993)
(arguing for pregnancy accommodation under the ADA rather than the traditional
Equal Protection or Title VII analysis).
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pregnant, such as employers' facially neutral leave policies. 30 5
Take the case of an employer that does not provide leave for
any disability or illness. The issue is whether the failure to
provide pregnancy leave discriminates against women. Equal
treatment theorists focus on how the employer treats pregnancy as
compared to medical conditions suffered by men. If the employer
does not provide leave for other illnesses, then men and women
are being treated the same, and there is no discrimination.
Special treatment theorists would evaluate such policies from a
different framework. They would argue that even if no disability
leave is provided for other illnesses, leave should still be provided
for women during pregnancy to equalize women and men's ability
to be successful employees while engaging in reproductive activity.
Because of women's unique ability to become pregnant and the
different reproductive consequences for men versus women, only
women are temporarily physically disabled as a result of
reproduction. The employer should accommodate these differences
by providing pregnancy leave because only this approach would
put men and women on truly equal footing in terms of their ability
to engage in reproductive activity and advance professionally. 30 6
This debate is illustrated in a non-benefits case from the
Seventh Circuit, Troupe v. May Department Stores Co. 307 In
Troupe, a woman who was placed on probation for repeated
tardiness due to severe morning sickness was ultimately fired the
day before she was due to start her maternity leave. 308 She
alleged a Title VII and PDA violation on the grounds that she was
fired because of her pregnancy.30 9 In rejecting the plaintiffs claim,
Judge Posner framed the issue as whether the discharge of a
pregnant employee to avoid paying the costs of maternity leave is
discrimination under the PDA. Posner asserted that such a
financially motivated dismissal alone does not violate Title VII,
since employers "can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat
similarly affected but non-pregnant employees." 310 In other words,
if other employees who were repeatedly tardy or about to take a
long leave were fired, then the firing of the plaintiff would not
305. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 303, at 24-30.
306. See id. at 30-31.
307. 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
308. Id. at 735-36.
309. 20 F.3d at 734. She also alleged that her supervisor claimed she was being
fired because the company did not expect her to return after she had the baby. Id.
at 735-36.
310. 20 F.3d at 738 (noting, however, that this might violate other employment
or contract laws).
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constitute gender discrimination.
Judge Posner believed this result was dictated by the equal
treatment principle underlying the PDA, which he interpreted as
requiring the employer to ignore an employee's pregnancy. In fact,
he went even further and expressly warned plaintiffs against
trying to use a disparate impact claim based on the PDA to get
special treatment for pregnancy:
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not, despite the
urgings of feminist scholars.., require employers to offer
maternity leave or take other steps to make it easier for
pregnant women to work .... Employers can treat pregnant
women as badly as they treat similarly affected but
nonpregnant employees.... [D]isparate impact is a
permissible theory of liability under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, as it is under other provisions of Title VII.
But, properly understood, disparate impact as a theory of
liability is a means of dealing with the residues of past
discrimination, rather than a warrant for favoritism. 311
Under the dominant approach, courts view plaintiffs' PDA-
based argument as one for special treatment. 312 Courts seem to
assume that a blanket exclusion of infertility or contraceptive
methods used by men and women is analogous to an employer's
gender-neutral policy of denying any sick or disability leave or
terminating an employee for a gender-neutral reason such as
tardiness.3 13 Consequently, using the PDA to analyze the claim
would effectively be a mandate to employers to provide medical
treatment related to a woman's ability to control her fertility,
privileging women over men or creating special protection for
reproductive treatment generally.
311. Id. (citations omitted). Troupe has been criticized on several grounds.
While Troupe has been cited for the notion that the PDA only requires equal or
comparable treatment, and not special treatment for pregnancy-related conditions,
Troupe does not give any guidance about finding an appropriate comparison point
where the challenge is to exclusions of sex-specific benefits. Posner expressly
acknowledged that in some situations a comparison group may not exist, but did
not elaborate on what to do in those instances. Id. Troupe's approach has also
been criticized for enabling employers to fire employees based on a gender
stereotype about the likelihood of pregnant women returning to work, which is
exactly the type of discrimination the PDA was designed to prevent. See generally
Ann C. McGinley & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Condescending Contradictions: Richard
Posner's Pragmatism and Pregnancy Discrimination, 46 FLA. L. REV. 193 (1994).
312. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (noting PDA is not about favoritism for female
reproductive rights).
313. Id. ("Employers can treat pregnant women as bad as they treat [non-
pregnant employees]."). See supra Part IV.B. (discussion of infertility cases).
20051
Law and Inequality
B. Why the Dominant Approach is Not Faithful to the
Equality Principles of Title VII and the PDA
For purposes of this Article, I do not take issue with the
notion that Title VII and the PDA require equal treatment, as
opposed to special treatment, for women. 314 What I argue,
however, is that courts' concerns about special treatment in these
cases is misplaced. Rather, the dominant approach undermines
the equality principles of Title VII due to several flawed
assumptions that appear to be underlying the courts' fear.
1. Distinguishing Inaction from Deliberate Line-Drawing
by Employers
First, the assumption that special treatment necessarily
follows from considering the relationship between the excluded
treatment and pregnancy is wrong. The problem identified with
the "special treatment approach" is that it creates an affirmative
obligation on the employer to identify and acknowledge differences
between the sexes, and to accommodate those differences by
treating one sex differently. An employer's inaction or policies
governing adverse actions that truly do have the same harmful
effect on men and women, such as a policy of terminating
employees for repeated tardiness, would violate the statute
because of the employer's failure to accommodate pregnancy. 315
Courts using the dominant approach incorrectly assume that
apparently neutral benefit exclusions present the same problem.
There are important distinctions between policy exclusions of
reproductive health benefits and the cases of adverse actions, such
as termination or denial of promotion.316 In insurance exclusion
cases, employers are affirmatively acting to exclude (or adopt an
exclusion) directly related to reproductive health, which can and
does result in less comprehensive coverage for women's
314. A discussion of whether the special or equal treatment approach is
normatively better is beyond the scope of this Article. I assume for purposes of this
Article that the equal treatment approach is the limiting principle of Title VII. See,
e.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 286-87 (1987) (citing the
legislative history to support the interpretation that "the PDA does not require
employers to extend any benefits to pregnant women that they do not already
provide to other disabled employees").
315. See id. at 1027 (noting concern over whether sex difference ever should be
considered when determining the propriety of considering pregnancy to achieve
equal employment opportunity, and that the equal treatment approach requires
treating pregnancy as any other disability, whereas the special treatment approach
would perpetuate paternalism and patriarchy).
316. See supra notes 32-83 and accompanying text.
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reproductive health. Moreover, an assumption that such
classifications are based on a gender-neutral assignment of risk
ignores the pervasive history of discrimination against women in
reproductive health matters and employment generally.
2. Disparate Impact Claims Serve the Equality Principles
of Title VII and the PDA
Troupe's warning about using disparate impact and the PDA
as a weapon to obtain special treatment of pregnancy is
misleading and incomplete; it does not give an example of the
proper use of disparate impact in pregnancy-related claims. 317
Contrary to Troupe's warnings, disparate impact claims have been
embraced by equal treatment theorists as critical in furthering the
equality principles under Title VII and the PDA. 3 18
In the equal-versus-special-treatment debate, each side has
refined its position as it has engaged in thoughtful dialogue about
the perceived limitations or dangers of each approach. 319 For
example, both sides worry about the negative effects that focusing
on pregnancy and difference can have in the long term--especially
with a history of employers treating women adversely on the basis
of pregnancy. On the other hand, both sides agree that too much
deference to an employer's facially neutral policy can mask
discriminatory treatment.320
The equal treatment approach has been criticized as not
being protective enough because it requires us to find a point of
comparison between men and women upon which to determine
differential treatment or impact. 32 1 Practically, however, if a male
norm or standard of comparison is used, it can operate as hidden
discrimination and be dressed up in a legal framework that
prevents plaintiffs from ever getting their cases heard. 322 Equal
317. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738.
318. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (using disparate
impact approach where employer applies facially neutral policies that have an
adverse affect on some because of gender); see also Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434
U.S. 136, 139-43 (1977) (using a disparate impact test to invalidate a policy
denying women accumulated seniority because of child birth-related absences,
which was facially neutral but placed an undue burden on women).
319. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 1279; see also Kay, supra note 303.
320. See Kay supra note 303, at 32-37; Littleton, supra note 319, at 1325-27.
321. See Kenney, supra note 304, at 355 ("Feminists have called into question
the core of the concept of discrimination contained in both antidiscrimination
legislation and the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. Having rights
and privileges depends upon the extent to which women are like men.")
322. See Littleton, supra note 319, at 1280-82 (offering a vision of an equal
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treatment advocates have recognized this problem and answered it
by embracing a disparate impact claim to allow plaintiffs to
challenge facially neutral policies that adversely affect women. 323
However, discussion of disparate impact is almost non-
existent in reproductive health benefits cases. When courts do
discuss it, they seem to collapse the disparate treatment and
impact analysis, assuming no disparate impact from the fact that
there is no disparate treatment. 324 This was one of the key
mistakes the Court made in Gilbert. Where courts do go further
and discuss disparate impact claims in the infertility cases, they
quickly cite statistics showing that the condition of infertility
affects men and women equally. 325 This analysis is woefully
lacking, however, because there is a qualitative aspect to the harm
that is being neglected. Typically, disparate impact claims focus
on how many women as compared to men are affected, which is a
quantitative analysis. This makes sense in most cases because the
nature of the harm is the same for men and women, such as a
denial of a job or promotion. As shown in Part III, however,
benefits exclusions can have qualitatively different gender-specific
effects. 326 For example, because reproductive health treatment is
sex-specific, a facially neutral exclusion may effectively exclude
forms of treatment used exclusively by women or may exclude
more forms of female-specific treatment. Because the excluded
treatment directly relates to a women's ability to become pregnant,
an exclusion can also result in adverse health effects suffered only
by women. 327
treatment approach called "Equality as Acceptance" that is not dependent on a
male norm and arguing in favor of the statute challenged in Guerra on these
grounds).
323. See, e.g., Williams & Segal, supra note 20, at 364.
324. This mistake was made by the majority in Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976). See supra discussion Part I.B.1.
325. See Lynne M. Thomas, Abandoned Frozen Embryos and Texas Law of
Abandoned Personal Property: Should There Be a Connection?, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J.
255 (1997) (noting decreased fertility, while most often associated with women,
strikes men and women equally).
326. See supra notes 161-232 and accompanying text.
327. This neglect of the qualitative aspect to disparate impact is also evident
from the fact that the key infertility cases cited to International Union v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991), a challenge to a fertility classification in an
adverse action, for support in rejecting the plaintiffs prima facie case. In Johnson
Controls, the defendant employer excluded fertile women from certain jobs with
high exposure to lead. Id. at 190. The employer argued that the exclusion should
be viewed as a classification based on fertility and should be treated as gender
neutral. Id. The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that since the policy only
excluded fertile women, it constituted facially disparate treatment. Id. at 198-99.
The Supreme Court held that because the "policy classifies on the basis of gender
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There is support for an approach that considers the
qualitative impact of facially neutral policies in Title VII claims.
For example, in Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,328 plaintiffs challenged
an employer's policy requiring its workers to speak only English
while working. The plaintiffs argued that the facially neutral
English-only policy violated Title VII because it had a per se
discriminatory impact on all Spanish-speaking employees. 329 The
district court granted plaintiffs' summary judgment, and Spun
Steak appealed. 330
The court noted that this case was atypical and one of first
impression because it did not involve a policy that created a
barrier to hiring or promotion. 331 Rather, the claim was that the
policy created disparities in the "terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment" by prohibiting the vast majority of workers at
Spun Steak from speaking their first language.332 The Ninth
Circuit made clear that a disparate impact claim may be used to
challenge policies that have an adverse impact on the "terms,
conditions, or privileges" of employment, even where no barrier to
employment exists.
3 33
and childbearing capacity, rather than fertility alone," the defendant could not even
make a credible gender-neutral argument. Id. at 198 (emphasis added). Both
Krauel and Saks relied heavily on this distinction in finding that no prima facie
case was made out for the infertility exclusions. Saks v. Covey, 316 F.3d 337 (2d
Cir. 2003); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1996).
However, the Court only used this distinction to find that the policy discriminated
on its face and therefore was an obvious disparate treatment claim. A more
reasonable implication from the Court's holding is that where a classification is
based on fertility "alone", a disparate impact claim would be more appropriate.
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198-99. Moreover, the Court's distinction between
fertility and childbearing capacity/gender must be read in conjunction with the
Court's ultimate holding that "Johnson Controls' policy is not neutral because it
does not apply to the reproductive capacity of the company's male employees in the
same way as it applies to that of the females." Id. at 199. It is necessary to
determine whether an employer's policy does truly apply to the reproductive
capacity of men and women "in the same way" in order to determine whether the
prima facie case is made out. As already demonstrated in Parts II and III, this
analysis can be very different in the case of denying reproductive health benefits
than in the case of an adverse action, such as firing. See supra notes 84-232 and
accompanying text.
328. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
329. See id. at 1484.
330. See id.
331. See id. at 1486.
332. See id.
333. Id. at 1484; see also Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987)
(finding that both disparate impact and disparate treatment Title VII proof
theories are applicable in compensation discrimination cases); Wambheim v. J.C.
Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984)
(rejecting the argument that § 2000e-2(a)(1) does not permit disparate impact cause
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More significantly, however, the court affirmed the viability
of a disparate impact claim based on qualitative rather than
quantitative effects.334  While the court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that there was a per se disparate impact, the court
affirmed that a disparate impact claim could be based on
qualitative effects. 335 The dispositive issue was whether the
plaintiff could in fact prove that a significant, adverse impact
resulted from the policy.33 6 The court provided guidance for how a
plaintiff could prove disparate impact when it is difficult to
quantify:
When the alleged disparate impact is on the conditions, terms,
or privileges of employment... determining whether the
protected group has been adversely affected may depend on
subjective factors not easily quantified. The plaintiff may not
merely assert that the policy has harmed members of the
group to which he or she belongs. Instead, the plaintiff must
prove the existence of adverse effects of the policy, must prove
that the impact of the policy is on terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment of the protected class, must prove
that the adverse effects are significant, and must prove that
the employee population in general is not affected by the
policy to the same degree.337
Thus, while plaintiffs do appear to have a more difficult
hurdle to overcome in qualitative disparate impact claims, such
claims can and should be used to challenge facially neutral
benefits exclusions that have adverse effects on women. Legal
scholars and health advocates have already amassed evidence of
these effects-from medical studies documenting the relationship
between lack of insurance coverage and increased health risks, to
surveys documenting the extent to which women versus men are
actually in need of and unable to get treatment for infertility or
of action). Despite the fact that there is nothing in the statute or regulations that
restricts disparate impact to hiring and firing, some question whether disparate
impact applies to claims of discrimination in other contexts. See, e.g., Garcia, 998
F.2d at 1485-86 (noting that the Supreme Court had expressly reserved deciding
the issue whether disparate impact is available to challenge discrimination in the
"terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment (citing Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,
434 U.S. 136, 144 (1977)).
334. See Garcia, 998 F.2d at 1489.
335. See id. at 1486.
336. See id.
337. Id. The problem in this particular case turned on whether adverse effects
could be proved. The court ultimately held that the bilingual employees did not
make out the prima facie case and remanded with instructions to grant summary
judgment in favor of Spun Steak. Id. However, for the claim by plaintiff-employees
with limited proficiency in English, the case was remanded for further proceeding
on the issue as to whether these employees were adversely impacted by the policy.
Id. at 1490.
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contraceptive services, to evidence of the extent to which
employers' and insurers' biases about women's sexuality and value
as pregnant employees motivate such decisions. 338 This evidence
should, at a minimum, satisfy the prima facie case for disparate
impact, which the employer can then try to rebut.
3. Employer's Rebuttal as a Limit on Special Treatment
There is also an important check on courts' and employers'
fears that the PDA will be used to require special treatment for
prescription contraception or infertility. A finding that a prima
facie violation is shown merely shifts the burden to the employer;
it does not mean an automatic win for the plaintiff.3 39 In the case
of a disparate impact claim, the employer has the opportunity to
rebut the plaintiffs allegations of the presence and significance of
the disparities. 340 Alternatively, employers can offer a legitimate,
neutral reason for the classification that supports the claim that
men and women really do receive comprehensive coverage. 341
Shifting the burden in these cases is consistent with the
purpose of Title VII and the PDA. This gives courts the chance to
do a meaningful examination of the employer's reasons and
plaintiffs claims of pretext, or in a disparate impact case, to
meaningfully assess the overall impact of the employer's coverage
of sex-specific conditions and treatment. Burden shifting is critical
in ferreting out policies that are in reality discriminatory but that
can be easily manipulated because of gender-neutral aspects. As I
will show below, the plaintiffs in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co. were
able to demonstrate disparate treatment and effects based on the
relationship of the excluded treatment to pregnancy. 342 However,
they won because they were able to successfully challenge the
employer's reasons-reasons which were not consistent with its
other policy decisions or with accepted medical practice, leaving
only an inference that gender bias motivated the exclusion.
C. Viewing the PDA as an Independent Source of Special
Treatment for Pregnancy is a Red Herring
The bottom line is that the notion of the PDA as a tool for
special treatment in these cases is a red herring. Relying on the
338. See supra notes 137-160 and accompanying text.
339. See Garcia, 998 F.2d at 1486.
340. See id.
341. See id.
342. See infra note 366-368 and accompanying text.
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PDA and the relationship between the classification and
pregnancy to help define the kinds of classifications that make out
a Title VII prima facie case is not using the PDA to mandate
special treatment for pregnancy. The limitations established
under the equal treatment theory still apply, as made clear in
Newport News and by the EEOC. 343 For example, the PDA could
not be used to require an employer to provide pregnancy-related
health benefits where no other medical benefits are provided.
However, where the employer has chosen to provide benefits and
expressly excludes a pregnancy-related condition or treatment, the
employer's classification should be scrutinized carefully. 344
Using the PDA in this manner is consistent with its open-
ended language covering not only pregnancy and childbirth, but
"related medical conditions" as well.3 45 It is also consistent with
the legislative history of the PDA documenting Congress's desire
to protect "the whole range of matters concerning the childbearing
process" 346 and to recognize "the right of women to have families
and to work" by giving them "the right to choose both, to be
financially and legally protected before, during, and after
pregnancy."347 The courts' preoccupation with the notion that the
PDA is being used as an independent basis of protection is
probably due as much to inartful pleadings by plaintiffs as to the
courts' own confusion and resistance to Title VII challenges to
benefits exclusions. However, once a meaningful disparate impact
model is used, it should be clear that a PDA-based claim is not
even necessary.
VI. Erickson: A Roadmap for Change or an Empty Promise?
In Erickson, a class action was brought under Title VII as
amended by the PDA challenging the exclusion of prescription
contraceptives from its otherwise comprehensive prescription
343. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
344. See Williams, supra note 48, at 333, 335. Williams writes:
The legal distinctions flowed from the central premise that men and
women were destined for separate social roles because of innate differences
between them, most centrally women's reproductive function .... Implicit
[in many of these rules] was not only a factual but a normative judgment:
when wage-earning women became pregnant they did, and should, go
home.
Id.
345. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e (2000).
346. H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4745,
4753.
347. 124 CONG. REC. 38, 574 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (statement of Rep. Sarasin).
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benefits plan.3 48 The court seemed to find this an easy case of
facial disparate treatment in light of the framework established in
Newport News, because the employer excluded medical treatment
which was only available to women.3 49 The court could have
stopped here, but it went further in using the PDA and the
excluded benefit's relationship to pregnancy to support its holding.
Specifically, the court highlighted the sex-specific purpose of
contraception and the unique adverse health effects women suffer
from the denial of access to such treatment due to their capacity to
become pregnant. 350 It then held that "classifying employees on
the basis of their childbearing capacity, regardless of whether they
are, in fact, pregnant, is sex-based discrimination" and "the law is
no longer blind to the fact that only women can get pregnant, bear
children, or use prescription contraception."3 51
The employer attempted to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie
case by offering several apparently neutral reasons for the
exclusion.35 2 The plaintiff successfully challenged the legitimacy of
each of these reasons, further supporting an inference of
discrimination.3 53 Briefly, the employer cited many of the common
justifications set out in Part III of this Article-that medication to
prevent pregnancy is not medically necessary since pregnancy is
not an illness or disease, that preventive treatment is not
considered medically necessary, and that prescription
348. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001). The plan
excluded prescription contraceptives such as birth control pills, Norplant, Depo-
Provera, intra-uterine devices, and diaphragms. Id. at 1268. The claim was
brought on behalf of the non-union female employees of Bartell. Id.
349. Id. at 1270-71.
350. Id. at 1271-73.
351. Id. at 1271. The Erickson decision reinforced the EEOC's interpretation of
such exclusions in a decision issued the prior year. In December 2000, the EEOC
issued a decision that the failure to offer insurance coverage for prescription
contraceptive drugs and devices may be a violation of Title VII, as amended by the
PDA. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Decision (Dec. 14, 2000),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2005) [hereinafter EEOC Decision]. The EEOC considered two
types of exclusions: (1) a categorical exclusion of oral contraceptives for birth
control, to alleviate the symptoms of dysmenorrhea and pre-menstrual syndrome,
and to prevent the development of ovarian cancer, and (2) exclusion of Depo
Provera for birth control purposes. Id. The EEOC used the same disparate
treatment analysis as Erickson in finding that both exclusions violated Title VII.
See id.; see also Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271. However, the EEOC also found
that exclusions of prescription contraceptives used for birth control purposes violate
the express terms of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. EEOC Decision.
352. See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
353. See id.; see also supra notes 161-232 and accompanying text.
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contraception is a luxury or lifestyle choice. 354 For the reasons
given in Parts II and III, the plaintiff was able to show that such
justifications were either not based on sound medical practice or
were inconsistent with the employer's other coverage decisions. 355
Finally, the employer also asserted a cost defense; 356 however, the
court relied on Manhart in holding that there was no cost defense
in Title VII cases. 357 The court also interpreted the legislative
reversal of Gilbert as "requir[ing] employers to provide women-
only benefits or otherwise incur additional expenses on behalf of
women in order to treat the sexes the same."358
It may not be immediately clear whether Erickson offers an
alternative model to that of the dominant approach or whether the
plaintiffs were successful precisely because this was an easy case
of disparate treatment. Indeed, the court makes it clear that it
does not rely solely on the PDA when it notes that "regardless of
whether the prevention of pregnancy falls within the phrase
'pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,' Congress'
[sic] decisive overruling of General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert...
evidences an interpretation of Title VII which necessarily
precludes the choices [the employer] has made in this case." 359
The court certainly does not claim to be doing anything novel or
distinct. For several reasons, however, I believe that the court's
reasoning suggests a bolder move that would allow plaintiffs a
meaningful opportunity to bring disparate treatment and impact
claims under Title VII.360
First, the court did not stop at the obvious link between the
form of treatment and gender. It embraced the PDA-based claim
and seemed to rely heavily on the relationship of prescription
contraception to pregnancy in supporting its conclusion that
gender inequality would result from this exclusion.361 While this
came primarily in analyzing the employer's justifications for the
exclusion, the court's reliance on the PDA is a striking contrast to
the dominant approach, which treated the PDA as irrelevant.
Moreover, while the Erickson court did not have to address the
disparate impact claim, it used language consistent with a
354. Id.
355. Id. 1272-75. For example, many types of preventive medication and
treatment were covered. Id.; see also supra notes 84-232 and accompanying text.
356. Id. at 1275.
357. Id. at 1274; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
358. Id. at 1270; see also Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 125.
359. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1274 (citations omitted).
360. See supra notes 84-160 and accompanying text.
361. See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
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qualitative disparate impact analysis, highlighting the unique
nature of the harm suffered by women as a result of such
exclusions. 362 Finally, although the court did not have to deal with
infertility exclusions, in dicta it seemed to view even such
neutrally drawn categories with suspicion.363
In sum, Erickson seems to construct a model for a more
powerful Title VII and PDA due to several reasons: its willingness
to view reproductive health exclusions as likely proxies for gender
discrimination; its willingness to consider the relationship
between the excluded benefit and pregnancy in determining the
unique cost and health effects suffered by women as a result of the
exclusions; and its refusal to defer to employers' purported
justifications and managerial discretion in light of the pervasive
history of pregnancy-based discrimination.
Conclusion
Medicine can never be completely divorced from our social
and moral judgments about the proper role of medical treatment
in our lives or whether scarce resources should be used to provide
such treatment. The role that morality plays is most prominent in
the reproductive health area, especially for treatment that enables
women to control their fertility. However, society has decided that
discrimination based on certain kinds of assumptions is
unacceptable because of the harm it can cause socially,
psychologically, physically, and economically. Actions that exclude
women or treat them differently based on gender stereotypes are
such examples, and Title VII and the PDA were enacted precisely
to combat this type of discrimination. 364 Nonetheless, many courts
have failed to embrace Title VII and the PDA as a means to
eliminate discriminatory patterns in the allocation of employment-
based health benefits. 365
362. It is noteworthy that the court relied heavily on the substantive arguments
made by Sylvia Law who used a disparate impact analysis in challenging
exclusions of prescription contraception. See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1272-73;
see also Ernest F. Lidge III, An Employer's Exclusion of Coverage for Contraceptive
Drugs is Not Per Se Sex Discrimination, 76 TEMPLE L. REV. 533, 560 (2003)
(characterizing the Erickson decision as confusing disparate treatment and
disparate impact theories because of its discussion of the unique burdens suffered
by women due to unwanted pregnancies).
363. For example, in a measured acknowledgement of the challenge of applying
Title VII to exclusions of infertility treatment, the court noted that "there is at least
an argument that the exclusion of infertility drugs applies equally to male and
female employees .. " Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
364. See supra notes 32-83 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 233-294 and accompanying text.
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Erickson provides a model for salvaging Title VII as a tool for
challenging the discriminatory allocation of benefits. This decision
appears to embrace a more meaningful disparate impact analysis
by looking beyond the employer's purported neutral classification
scheme to consider how women are uniquely harmed by the
exclusions and by closely scrutinizing the employer's
justification. 366 Practically, Erickson also demonstrates the
importance of marrying health and civil rights law effectively.
Health lawyers need to understand the fears driving the current
civil rights framework because these fears have created an
inherent resistance to benefits challenges. In this Article, I have
tried to offer a tool to help counter this resistance by answering
courts' fears of special treatment for pregnancy and by educating
courts about the discriminatory patterns and effects that women
face in reproductive health care.
I am hopeful that with the increasing medical and
sociological evidence of the harmful effects on women and the
growing outrage about insurance disparities because of high
profile drugs like Viagra, the importance of Title VII and the PDA
for challenging such exclusions will become more apparent. At
least for now, Erickson has provided a good roadmap for using
Title VII and the PDA to ensure true equality in employment-
based health care.
366. See supra notes 348-363 and accompanying text.
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